OMNI
UKRAINE WAR ANTHOLOGY #36
October 28, 2025
Compiled by Dick Bennett for a Culture of Peace, Justice, and
Ecology
CONTENTS UKRAINE
WAR ANTHOLOGY #36
THE WAR
TODAY
Big Serge. “Russo-Ukrainian
War: Autumn 2025.”
Origins of the War
Oliver Stone, “Ukraine on Fire.”
NYT: “Leaker
Exposes US” Involvement in Context of Imperialism
Isaac Chotiner. “Why John Mearsheimer
Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine.”
And a dozen more articles.
Ending
the War
Scott Ritter. “Give
Peace a Chance.”
Normon Solomon. “Democrats Should Give
Peace a Chance….”
Anatol Lieven. “Trump-Putin Call Is a
Positive Step.”
And 9 more articles.
TEXTS
THE WAR ON OCTOBER 27, 2025
[Note: I have discovered many excellent
analyses alternative to the US/NATO explanations of the war, such as those by Stephen
Sachs and Andreas Malm. My last published
anthology on the Russo-Ukrainian War was #35.
Nos. 36, 37, and 38 have awaited final editing. Nos. 39 and 40 are gathering. But I have been pulled to other subjects,
such as Gaza and US/NATO Soviet/Russophobia (I hope to finish #8 today). Yet truly impressive analyses of the war that
enable you and me to assess, to think outside the closed circle of, US/NATO policies
and actions keep arriving, such as the one yesterday by Big Serge that leads
off today’s anthology #36 on the Ukraine-Russian War. I have read several of his articles (some are
probably waiting for publication). He
seems to know everything essential about the policies, the armaments, and the battle
conditions of both sides. And he
provides numerous maps, which I reproduce.
So I am stepping away a moment
from US warmaking pathology and Gaza and other urgent matters to return to Ukraine
War #36 with Big Serge’s account of the war now. The remaining articles were originally
published in August 2025, 2023, one 2016.
--Dick
Big
Serge from Big Serge Thought bigserge@substack.com Oct. 27, 2025. Forwarded this
email? Subscribe here for more
Big Serge.
“Living
Dangerously: Russo-Ukrainian War: Autumn 2025.” Oct 27, 2025. 
With 7 maps.
Presented as in the original.
The
Russo-Ukrainian War seems to have been engineered in a laboratory to frustrate
people with repetition and analytic paralysis. Headlines appear to be
circulating on a choreographed loop, all the way down to the place names. Kaja
Kallas at the European Commission recently announced, without a hint of irony,
that Europe’s new sanctions package - the 19th one - is the toughest yet.
Ukraine’s supporters are insisting that Tomahawk missiles are the weapons
system that will finally change the game and break the war decisively in Kiev’s
favor - reiterating the same grandiose claims that they made about GLMRS, and
Leopards, and Abrams, and F-16s, and Storm Shadows, and ATACMs, and virtually
every other piece of military hardware in NATO’s inventories. On the ground,
Russia is attacking settlements named Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke; it recently
captured Toretsk and Tors’ke and is now attacking Torets’ke. The more things
change, the more things stay the same.
The
analytic frameworks applied to the war have also changed relatively little,
buried and obfuscated by the nebulous concept of attrition. On the Ukrainian
side, there is continued insistence that Russia is suffering exorbitant losses
and straining under the pressure of Ukrainian deep strikes, while Ukrainian
setbacks are blamed in large part on the failure of the United States to expand
its largesse and give Ukraine everything it needs. Many pro-Russian lines of
thinking mirror this and suppose that the AFU is on the verge of
disintegration, while the Kremlin is accused of failing to “take the gloves
off”, particularly in regards to the Ukrainian energy grid, Dnieper bridges,
and dams.
The
result is a very strange sort of war. This is an extraordinarily high-intensity
ground war. Both armies remain in the field, holding hundreds of miles of
continuous front after years of bloody fighting. Both armies are (depending on
who you ask) taking unsustainable casualties which ought to lead to collapse
soon, and yet Moscow, Keiv, and Washington are all (again, depending on who you
ask) guilty of failing to take the war seriously enough. All of this is
maddeningly repetitive, and one could be forgiven for tuning out entirely. Even
the diplomatic tango between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, after delivering a few
entertaining moments, failed to really move the needle in any discernable
direction.
Few
would argue that the trajectory of the war changed in an obviously dramatic way
in 2025, and it is important to avoid the worn out and clichéd language about
“turning points” or “collapse” or any such silly thing. However, 2025 saw
several shifts in the war, which will hardly ostentatious or dramatic, are
nevertheless very important. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which
Ukraine launched no ground offensives or proactive operations of its own. This
fact is not only a hint at the threadbare state of Ukraine’s ground forces, but
also a testament to the way Russian forces transformed “attrition” from a
buzzword into a method of persistent pressure across a variety of axes this
year.
In
lieu of initiative on the ground, and facing a slow but relentless rollback of
their defenses in the Donbas, the theory of Ukrainian victory has shifted in an
unacknowledged but dramatic way. After years of insisting that it would achieve
maximal territorial integrity - an outcome which would require the total and
decisive defeat of Russia’s ground forces - Ukraine has reframed its path to
victory mainly as a process of inflicting strategic costs on Russia that mount
until the Kremlin agrees to a ceasefire. Consequentially, the debate about
arming Ukraine has shifted from a conversation about armor and artillery -
equipment useful for retaking lost territories - to a discussion about deep
striking weapons like Tomahawks, which can be used to shoot at Russian oil
refineries and energy infrastructure. In short, rather than move to prevent
Russian from achieving immediate operational objectives in the Donbas, Ukraine
and its sponsors are now seeking ways to make Russia pay a price such that
victory on the ground is no longer worth it. It is unclear whether they have
thought about what price Ukraine will pay in the exchange. Perhaps they do not
care.
About
Tomahawks
Notwithstanding
Ukraine’s attempts to jumpstart indigenous production, it is inevitable that
Ukrainian capabilities will be largely determined by the largesse of western
sponsors. This aspect of the war took a sudden turn at the beginning of the
October when fresh reporting began to circulate that Tomahawk missiles might be
on the table for Ukraine. Tomahawks have always been on Ukraine’s wish list
(given that the Ukrainian wish list as such consists of essentially all the
military equipment in NATO’s combined inventories) but this was the first
reporting that they might be under serious consideration.
As is
frequently the case, the discussion spiraled away from realistic grounding,
with some suggesting that the Tomahawk would be a
“game changer” for Ukraine (where have we
heard that before?) and the pro-Russian sphere dismissing it as an irrelevant
distraction. There’s a tendency to focus on the quality of American weapons
systems, casting them as either unrivaled technological marvels or overhyped and
overpriced baubles, but this is generally not productive and largely irrelevant
to the matter at hand. The Tomahawk, broadly speaking, is exactly as
advertised, and provides proven and reliable strike capability at strategic
depths in excess of 1,000 miles. In role, range, and payload it is essentially
an analog to Russia’s Kalibr missiles (I am begging the enthusiasts to note the
phrase “essentially an analog” rather than rake me over the coals over the
different guidance systems and other technical minutia). Such a system will
always be valuable and would obviously improve Ukraine’s deep strike
capabilities.
The
“problem” with Tomahawks does not relate to any “problem” with the missile
itself, but with its availability and Ukraine’s technical capability to launch
them. The Tomahawk is conventionally a ship-launched missile (there is no
extant air-launched variant) with a few novel options for ground launch.
Ukraine, obviously, would require ground launch systems, and the problem is
that these systems are essentially brand new and available in very limited
quantities: more importantly, American service branches are in the process of
trying to build out these capabilities throughout the decade. Providing
ground-launchable Tomahawks to Ukraine in any meaningful numbers would
therefore essentially require the US Army and Marines to scrap their own force
buildout plans.
There
are two basic options for ground launching Tomahawks. One of these is the US
Army’s MRC (Mid-Range Capability) Launcher, dubbed the Typhon. This
is an enormous tractor-trailer launcher with four launch tubes, first delivered
in 2023. It has an enormous footprint - so large, apparently, that the Army is already
asking for a smaller replacement - and is intended
to give the Army an organic fires component in the gap between the shorter
range Precision Strike Missile and hypersonic systems (which do not yet exist).
The critical fact is this: the Army intends to field a total of five Typhon
batteries by 2028, of which two have been delivered so far. Each battery
consists in turn of four launchers, implying that eight out of a planned twenty
launchers have been delivered. Even more importantly, both of the currently
operational batteries are already deployed, with one in the Philippines and one in Japan.
These systems are being actively used in
exercises and trials, including an exercise this summer in Australia.
The Typhon system
gives ground launch capability to the Tomahawk but brings a massive footprint
The
situation with the Marine Corps’ launch system is quite similar, although the
launch platforms themselves could not be more different. Unlike the lumbering
Typhon tractor trailer, the Marines are fielding a significantly more
lithe and compact LMSL system, with the tradeoff of a
single launch tube compared to the Typhon’s four. What matters is not so much
the technical differences, as the fact that the Marines - like the Army - only received their
first deliveries in 2023, and they are currently
in the process of building out the force. In the case of the marines, the goal
is to have a Tomahawk battalion built out by 2030. In
fact, the production contract came into effect as recently as 2025.
What
does all of that mean? It means that, although the Tomahawk itself is a fine
missile, the systems for ground launch are so new and available in such limited
quantities that equipping Ukraine with Tomahawks would require either the US
Army or the Marines to materially alter their force structure in the near term
(through 2030, essentially). These are essentially the opposite of much of the
gear that’s been given to Ukraine to this point: far from being inventories of
older systems that can be earmarked as surplus or tabbed for replacement,
Tomahawk ground launch is a brand new capability that is in the middle of
deployment and buildout for the first time.
This
is, of course, a layered complication on top of Tomahawk quantities in and of
themselves. The issue of Tomahawk availability is both over and under
emphasized, depending on the context. The United States has something like
4,000 Tomahawks in its inventories (although half of these are currently inside
their cells on American ships), so it is not quite correct to say (as some have) that
America is running out of these critical weapons. The issue is that production
rates are relatively anemic (generally between 55 and 90 per year) and are fail
to replenish the expenditure from even relatively brief strike campaigns, such
as the repeated strikes on
Yemen. Broadly speaking, then, the issue is not so much that the
United States is in immediate danger of running out of Tomahawks, but that
procurement schedules are so slow that even relatively minor expenditures can
erase multiple years worth of deliveries.
It may
be useful, then, to consider Tomahawks in comparison to the ATACMs missiles
which have already been provided to Ukraine. Unlike the Tomahawk, the ATACMs is
a system which has already been tabbed for
replacement, with the Precision Strike Missile in the early phases of
its rollout. ATACMs were also compatible with launch systems that Ukraine
already had. In comparison to Tomahawks, then, ATACMs are both vastly more
strategically expendable, produced in larger numbers, and easier to deploy.
Despite all these points in their favor, the United States provided Ukraine with
just 40 ATACMs. Even if the Army could be pressured into handing over one
or two of its brand new Typhon launchers, it is difficult to imagine that more
than few dozen Tomahawks could be spared for Ukraine: a token inventory far too
small to wage a sustained strike campaign in the Russian heartland.
Peace, Sponsored by
Raytheon
Given
that Tomahawks for Ukraine would be measured in the dozens, rather than the
hundreds, it’s worth asking whether this could actually change anything for the
AFU at the front. The answer is clearly no in the long run, but it would be
unwise to dismiss the possibility that even a limited tranche of Tomahawks
(let’s say 40 to 50 missiles) could help alleviate pressure on Ukrainian forces
at the front, provided they were used appropriately. A short term boost to
Ukrainian strike capabilities, if deployed against Russian rear areas, could
force further dispersal and rationing of Russian assets and temporarily stall
Russia’s emerging multi-axis offensive. This could defer the loss of key
positions until early 2026. This presumes, however, that the Ukrainians would
be content to use Tomahawks against operational targets. In reality, Ukraine
can never seem to resist lobbing missiles at targets that have little bearing
on the front, like the Kerch Bridge. Indeed, a failure to synergize strikes at
depth with operations on the ground is a major reason why the ATACMs achieved
so little.
On the
other side of this equation, it is a common complaint from the Russian
perspective that Moscow has done too little to “deter” the United States from
empowering Ukraine’s strike campaign - both by directly providing munitions and
supplying the planning, ISR, and guidance systems. This, however, rather misses
the point. Russia has done nothing of note to deter the United States because
both Moscow and Washington understand fully that there is essentially no
appetite (on either side) for a direct confrontation. In the (sensible) absence
of a willingness to strike back at NATO targets, there is really nothing Russia
can do to deter beyond maintaining its own retaliatory capabilities. The issue
is not that Russia has failed to actively deter, but that there is nothing they
could do even if they wanted to.
The
basic pattern here is well established. The United States has done what it can
to backstop Ukrainian strike capabilities, but it has held them at a level
where Ukraine’s damage output falls far short of decisive levels. So long as
that is the case, Russia has clearly demonstrated that it will simply eat the
punches and retaliate against *Ukraine*. Hence, when the United States helps
Ukraine target Russian oil facilities, it is Ukraine that
receives the reprisal, and it is Ukraine which has
its natural gas production annihilated as the winter approaches. In a
sense, neither side is really trying to deter the other at all. The United
States has raised the cost of this war for Russia, but not enough to create any
real pressure for Moscow to end the conflict; in response, Russia punishes
Ukraine, which is something the United States does not really care about. The
result is a sort of geostrategic Picture of Dorian Gray, where the United
States vicariously inflicts cathartic damage on Russia, but Ukraine accrues all
the soul damage.
In the
case of Tomahawks, the risk-reward calculus is just not there. Tomahawks are a
strategically invaluable asset that the United States cannot afford to hand out
like candy. Even if the launch systems could be provided (highly doubtful), the
missiles could not be made available in sufficient quantities to make a
difference. The range of the missiles, however, significantly raises the
probability of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Ukraine shooting
American missiles at energy infrastructure in Belgorod or Rostov is one thing;
shooting them at the Kremlin is another thing entirely.
There
is, however, another aspect of this which seems to be garnering little
attention. The biggest risk of sending Tomahawks is not that the Ukrainians
will blow up the Kremlin and start World War Three. The bigger risk is that the
Tomahawks are used, and Russia simply moves on after eating the strikes.
Tomahawks are arguably one of the last - if not *the* last - rung in the
escalation ladder for the USA. We have rapidly run through the chain of systems
that can be given to the AFU, and little remains except a few strike systems
like the Tomahawk or the JASSM. Ukraine has generally received everything it
has asked for. In the case of Tomahawks, however, the United States is running
the most serious risk of all: what if the Russians simply shoot down some of
the missiles and eat the rest of the strikes? It’s immaterial whether the
Tomahawks damage Russian powerplants or oil refineries. If Tomahawks are
delivered and consumed without seriously jarring Russian nerves, the last
escalatory card will have been played. If Russia perceives that America has
reached the limits of its ability to raise the costs of the war for Russia, it
undercuts the entire premise of negotiations. More simply put, Tomahawks are
most valuable as an asset to threaten with.
Reading
between the lines of President Trump’s public statements recently, it seems
likely that he has rationally weighed these considerations. Publicly, he used
the threat of Tomahawks to try and force Russia to keep negotiating, and he’s
received a commitment for another meeting with Putin for his trouble (more on
that later). He has now, for the time being, shelved the Tomahawk
plan, commenting that “we need them” and applying the
usual Trumpian linguistic style to the broadly accepted issue of inventories
which I have outlined here. Tomahawks are simply more valuable to the United
States as a tool to threaten escalation, rather than as an actual kinetic asset
in Ukrainian hands, and so long as Trump keeps his powder dry he can re-raise
the issue later.
Ultimately,
perhaps, this discussion is not about Tomahawks at all. These missiles, rather,
are simply a totem which demonstrate two important dovetailing points. First,
that American resources are not infinite, and as the United States reaches
deeper into its bag to help Ukraine, it begins to grab at strategically
critical assets that the US military simply cannot spare. Secondly, we must
remember that America’s policy in Ukraine is a game of titration, with
Washington probing the limits of Russia’s willingness to “eat the strikes”
without allowing the reprisal violence to spill out of Ukraine.
The
Big Banana: Russia’s Operational Schema
At
this point, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to say anything meaningful
about the actual operational progression on the ground. There are several
reasons for this. First and foremost, the war has now gone on so long and is
consistently moving at such an apparently glacial pace that most people simply
do not care at this point whether Russia holds Yampil or not, or whether they
have advanced past the rail line in Pokrovsk. There is severe fatigue (or
perhaps boredom is the better word) with the status of an interminable sequence
of apparently small settlements, industrial complexes, and forestry
plantations, and as a result most people have essentially checked out. Not the
least among these must surely be President Trump, who apparently chucked Zelensky’s map
of the frontline and complained that he was tired
of being shown the same maps over and over again.
On the
other hand, we have the true obsessives who continue to dutifully follow the
frontlines regularly and are voluntarily intaking daily updates. We end up with
a bifurcated system where some people are still highly plugged in to the micro
movements on the battlefield, but most people just don’t care, and we can
hardly blame the latter. I think it would be profitable, then, to think about
the broader Russian operational scheme, what it has achieved, and what it aims
to achieve in the coming year. This is probably more interesting and less
repetitious than fixating on the exact positioning within Pokrovsk or Kupyansk.
There
are two larger points that I think are worth making before we look at some
specifics.
First
and foremost, much of the battlefield analysis that comes out (particularly
from western analysts) makes firm pronouncements as to what constitutes
Russia’s “primary” and “secondary” efforts, but these are essentially
interpolated and frequently incorrect. For example, it’s become a fairly
mainstream conception that Russia’s “primary” point of effort right now is the
capture of Pokrovsk, but this does not actually seem supported by Russian
actions. There is no particular advantage to be gained for Russia by pushing to
capture Pokrovsk as soon as possible - the city is already in a stranglehold
partial encirclement. To be sure, Pokrovsk *was* a major logistic hub for
Ukrainian forces, but it can no longer serve that role and was sterilized as a
transit hub months ago, once it became a frontline city. The opposite side of
this coin is that other Russian axes of advance, particularly in southern
Donetsk and the bend of the Donets River, are dismissed as “secondary” efforts.
This is a major mistake, and I will attempt to show that these are critical
advances where Russia is shaping the battlefield to its advantage for follow on
operations.
Secondly,
it should be understood and appreciated that Ukraine has lost essentially all
battlefield initiative. In 2024, the AFU was able to assembled a mechanized
reserve and launch their operation into Kursk. This operation ultimately failed
and resulted in severe Ukrainian losses, but this is unrelated to the fact that
Ukraine was still able to accumulate forces and pursue offensive operations on
its own initiative. In 2025, however, Ukraine has been in a permanent state of
reactivity. This was the first year of the war in which Ukraine did not launch
any proactive operations or counteroffensives of its own, and Ukrainian hopes
have instead pivoted to their strategic strike campaign against Russian oil
facilities.
In a
larger sense, the effect of attrition can be seen year by year with the
shrinking scope of Ukraine’s proactive operations. In 2022, Ukraine was able to
launch a pair of widely separated offensives which yielded modest successes: an
offensive out of Kharkov rolled the front back over the Oskil River (though it
failed to collapse the Lugansk shoulder), meanwhile, a series of battles
outside of Kherson failed to break through the Russian lines, but they did play
a role in persuading the Russians to abandon their bridgehead over the Dnieper.
The point of course is not to once again autopsy these offensives, but to point
out that there were two of them, that they were meaningful in scale, and they
did result in important territorial gains for Ukraine. In 2023, by contrast,
Ukraine launched a single theater-level offensive in the south, which failed.
In 2024, we got the Kursk operation: smaller and less lavishly equipped than
2023’s Zaoprizhia offensive, and aimed at a peripheral theater. This year,
there were no proactive Ukrainian operations at all. There is a very clear
pattern at play here, with Ukraine’s offensive punch progressively shrinking
before disappearing entirely in 2025. This was a year of essentially
uninterrupted Russian initiative.
Putting
Ukraine permanently on the backfoot is a significant Russian achievement, and
it is owed to a few converging factors. Obviously, the attrition of Ukrainian
forces is a major factor. We’ve gone through the flailing Ukrainian
mobilization, the cannibalization of its forces, and the general lack of
reserves in detail on several occasions, and there’s no need to retread that
ground here. Suffice it to say, Ukraine’s ability to husband forces for
offensive operations appears to be severely degraded. Russia has exacerbated
this problem by pressing steadily on a variety of different axes. At the
moment, there are no fewer than seven Russian axes of attack, pressuring a slew
of cities all along the line. This creates a series of defensive emergencies,
maintains the burn rate on Ukrainian forces, and fixes them on the line.
Finally, in a point to be detailed shortly, Russian advances have begun
unraveling Ukraine’s logistic connectivity, which puts strain on supply and
prevents the concentration and accumulation of forces.
Eastern Ukraine:
Approximate Situation and Axes of Russian Advance
Now,
for the development of the front and the premise of the Russian offensive
scheme. The main point that I want to impress is essentially as follows: rather
than fixating on Pokrovsk, Russia’s advances across Southern Donetsk and on the
inner bend of the Donets River ought to be thought of as vital operations which
have severely disrupted the coherence of both the Ukrainian front and their
logistics. This has the triple effect of preventing the Ukrainians from
launching offensives of their own, accelerating the attrition of Ukrainian
forces, and shaping the front for the coming operation to capture the
Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
To
begin, let’s consider the progress that Russia has made in southern Donetsk,
both in raw territorial terms and its implications for Ukrainian logistic
connectivity. To demonstrate this, I’ve pulled maps from DeepState (again, a
Ukrainian mapping enterprise) for August 2023 (when Ukraine was attempting its
counterattack out of Orikhiv) and for October 20th, the week of this writing. I
have noted both the length of the southern front (obviously a linear
approximate, as the actual front has many bends and bulges) and highlighted the
key highways that Ukraine uses to run the backbone of its logistics.
The Southern Front:
2023 vs 2025
Now,
one thing that is worth noting is that the Russians are currently positioned to
roll up this front even further. Ukrainian defensive lines are primarily
oriented towards on a north-south axis. Once Russian forces cleared Kurakhove,
they entered the seams in these defensive lines - that is to say, they are
advancing laterally along the face of the prepared defenses, rather than trying
to bash through them from the front. This is one reason why their progress has
been relatively steady and uninterrupted. Now approaching the “elbow” in the
lines, where they pivot southward, and having crossed the Yanchur River, the
Russians are entering a substantial space that lacks meaningful prepared
defenses. Using the Military Summary map (Ukrainian fortifications are mapped
with yellow dots), the void in the defense is fairly obvious as the Russians
work their way into the elbow of the line.
Apart
from the obvious development of note here - that Russian forces have, to this
point, rolled up roughly half the length of the southern front and are
positioned to roll up another ten to fifteen miles - we want to note two things
which are emblematic of the way the war is going for Ukraine, but curiously
receive little attention. First, the compression of the front is robbing the
Ukrainians of the maneuver space which made it possible for them to stage and
assemble forces for their counteroffensive in 2023. Two years ago, there was a
wide, lateral buffer zone around the Ukrainian staging area in Orikhiv, and
Ukrainian forces had access to multiple highways where they could disperse
forces in their marching columns and run their logistics.
Today,
that buffer zone is gone, as is the easy access to several of the branch
highways. The Russian advance, which started with the breakthrough at Ugledar
and Kurakhove last year and which has now rolled up some 50 miles of front, has
essentially sterilized Ukraine’s capacity to attack in the south, because they
have neither the space nor the roads to safely accumulate forces here. It has
also shattered the interconnectivity of Ukrainian logistics: rather than having
several highways to shuttle troops and material to the east, Ukraine now has to
support several disconnected logistic fronts with individual highways. More to
the point, there is no longer a single Donetsk “front” to speak of, but rather
a series of logistic fronts: one in the south, around Orikhiv, another at
Pokrovsk, and the largest one in the Slovyansk Banana. These are lacking
lateral connectivity to each other for the Ukrainians due to the wedges that
the Russians have forced in the front, particularly in the south, funneling
logistics and reinforcements down individuated corridors.
The
bigger issue, however, lies farther north on the Pokrovsk and Donets axes, and
in the way that they synergize. People who are focusing, to the exclusion of
all else, on when and how Russia will capture Pokrovsk are failing to see the
bigger picture, and indeed are not even trying to understand it.
The
ultimate Russian operational objective (in this phase of the war, at least) is
the belt of cities which runs in an arc from Slovyansk to Kostyantinivka, which
I affectionately call “the Slovyansk Banana” due to its curved shape. A cursory
look at the map shows us why the very operations that are being dismissed as
secondary efforts are in fact critical axes of Russian effort which are shaping
the battlefield for the attack on the Banana.
There
are two very important facts about the Banana, from the perspective of
operational geography. The first is that, although the combined mass of the
agglomeration is far larger than any of the urban areas that have been fought
over to this point, the Banana is relatively difficult to defend because it
sits on the floor of a river valley: the Kazennyi Torets flows through all the
cities in the Banana before it flows into the Donets. Russian forces
approaching the city from the southwest, the east, and the north will all be
advancing along the high ground that overlooks the cities on the floor.
The
second important fact about the Banana is that, despite its size, it is
supported by just two highways which approach from the southwest and northwest
respectively, funneling into the Banana like a wedge. Taking the northern
highway/MSR (the E40 highway) as an example, we see that Russia’s operations
inside the Donets bend are hardly secondary efforts: they are vital shaping
operations linked to the integrity of the Banana. The E40 highway tracks the
Donets bend very closely (it generally stays within five miles of the river. If
the Russians sustain their progress north of the Donets and reach the river at
Bogorodychne or Svyatogirsk, it will not only put E40 under persistent drone
attack but also curl the defensive line behind the Banana, to say nothing of
the enormous pressure on the Siversk salient.
On the
Pokrovsk front as well, Russia’s progress is being misinterpreted. After their
breakthrough at the end of the summer, Russian forces have consolidated the
bulge north of Pokrovsk (despite weeks of Ukrainian counterattacks) and are
steadily working their way towards Rais’ke and Sergiivka. This is not about
Pokrovsk at all - reaching Rais’ke would put Russian forces directly in the
backfield of Kostyantinivka, on the supply lines to the underside of the
Banana.
I am
not suggesting at all that Russian forces are on the verge of some great
offensive surge that will carry them into the heart of the Banana instantly.
However, there is a fairly well established Russian operational methodology in
this war, which involves working their way methodically into Ukraine’s
logistical lanes and seams, segmenting the front and strangulating their
strongpoints, forcing them to supply frontline strongholds with single file
logistics and dirt roads. They did it in Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, they are doing
it in Pokrovsk, and they are shaping the front to attempt this on a large scale
in the Banana.
Assault on the
Banana: Coming 2026
The
general point that we are trying to make here is that dismissing Russian
advances in the Serebryanka Forest, the emerging bulge north of Pokrovsk, and
their move into the Donets Bend as “secondary efforts” is mistaken. Zooming out
to the appropriate scale shows that these are concentric operations, shaping
the front for a 2026 assault on the Banana - moving towards the E40 road from
the north, bending the defensive shield around Siversk, and working into the
underbelly of the Banana through Rais’ke.
This
is, perhaps, a long way to go for a short drink of water, but there are a few
basic points here that get completely missed when the view of the front is
preoccupied with the fighting inside Pokrovsk and Kupyansk:
1. Russia’s
advance out of Kurakhove across the southern front is not a secondary axis.
They have rolled up half of the southern front, condensing Ukrainian forces
into a compact space which sterilizes their ability to attack in the south.
2. Broad
Russian pressure across a half-dozen axes maintained a steady burn rate on
Ukrainian forces and prevented the accumulation of forces for proactive
operations. 2025 has been the first year of the war in which Ukraine has not
launched any offensive operations on its own initiative.
3. Advances
in the Donets bend and the interstitial space between Pokrovsk and
Kostyantinivka are not subsidiary or secondary operations: they are critical
shaping operations that are moving concentrically toward the Banana.
To be
frank, the general mood of optimism in the Ukrainian infosphere, which lasted
for much of the summer, struck me as remarkably odd. The frontline has yielded
no real good news for Ukraine at any point this year. Beyond the broader
strategic point, that Ukraine has lost the initiative and does not seem capable
of getting it back, Russia is in the process of capturing two important urban
centers (Russian troops are in the city centers of Pokrovsk and Kupyansk), it
has begun the assault on at leas two more (Lyman and Kostyantinivka), it has
rolled up half of the southern front, and cleared most of the inner
Donets-Oskil bend. The Banana is on deck for 2026.
Ukraine’s
Cost Theory of Victory
One
thing that has become apparent over the last year is that Kiev has abandoned
previous notions of outright victory on the battlefield and adopted a new
strategic framework predicated on imposing unacceptable costs on Russia, so
that Moscow will agree to freeze the conflict.
This
is a subtle and unspoken yet extremely important distinction. It is easy to
miss, because both Ukrainian leadership and Ukraine’s western backers continue
to speak of Ukrainian “victory” and the possibility of Ukraine “winning” the
war. What is crucial to understand is that the “victory” that they speak of now
is categorically different than the victory of 2022 and 2023. In the first
years of the war, it was possible to at least speak of Ukraine taking the
initiative to advance on the ground and retake territory. There were concrete
examples of Ukrainian offensives in 2022, and the battle in Zaporizhia -
although unsuccessful - showed that it was at least possible for Ukraine to
attempt a proper mechanized offensive.
Therefore,
in the first years of the war, when leaders in Kiev and Brussels and London and
Washington spoke of Ukrainian victory, they essentially meant the defeat of the
Russian ground forces and the reconquest of much (or all) of the Donbas. The
Kursk Operation of 2024 began to split the difference: Ukraine still had some
resources to mount proactive operations, but these operations were no longer
aimed at the dense eastern front and instead aimed at relatively soft
subsidiary fronts with an eye to out-levering the Russians.
Today,
with the Ukrainian army stuck in a permanent state of reactivity and slowly
receding defense, it no longer makes any sense to speak of Ukrainian victory in
the most straightforward sense, which is to say victory on the battlefield - no
matter how tenaciously or bravely the Ukrainian rank and file continues to
fight in essentially intolerable circumstances. Instead, Ukrainian “victory”
has been transmogrified to mean essentially that Russia absorbs such exorbitant
costs that it agrees to some sort of ceasefire without preconditions.
The
costs to be imposed on Russia are implicitly assumed to be a mixture of
battlefield casualties and damage to strategic assets inflicted by Ukrainian
air strikes, and in regards to the latter Ukraine seems to be particularly
placing its hopes in a strategic strike campaign against Russian oil. Ukraine’s
attempts to disable Russian oil production and refining have dovetailed with
ever more aggressive sanctions from the United States against Russian fossil
fuel exports - although it is worth noting that the limited price
response to these sanctions indicates that markets expect
that Russian oil will continue to flow.
Trump’s
suggestion that Tomahawks may be on the table for Ukraine must be seen as a
constituent element of this new strategy and theory of victory. And this,
ultimately, is very important to understand. Tomahawks are not being bandied
about because anybody (in Kiev or Washington) believes that 50 cruise missiles
will allow Ukraine to defeat the Russian Army and recapture the Donbas.
Tomahawks were mentioned because the Ukrainian alliance is threatening to
cripple the Russian fossil fuels industry (through a mixture of sanctions and
kinetic strikes on production facilities) unless Putin agrees to a ceasefire.
This
is why it is wrong to be
surprised that Trump abruptly cancelled his meeting with Putin and instead
announced more sanctions. There’s nothing abrupt
or erratic about this. Threats to Russian oil are now, without exaggeration,
the main lever that the Ukrainian bloc has against Russia. It certainly should
not have been a surprise that the Kremlin, which has reiterated the same fundamental
war aims since day one, was not excited about coming to Budapest to freeze the
conflict, and neither should it surprise us that Trump would instead prefer to
pull harder on the oil lever. The two powers are playing entirely different
games: Russia is slow-walking negotiations while it advances on the ground, and
the United States is playing a pain game designed to raise the costs for
Russia.
We
have fundamentally reached an impasse when it comes to negotiations. For
Moscow, negotiations with the United States are essentially a way to string
Washington along. Moscow feels that it is winning on the ground, therefore a
diplomatic impasse suits Russian interests. When western leadership
complains that Russia does not seem interested in ending the war, they are
correct, but they are missing the point. Russia is not interested in ending the
war right now because doing so would not serve Russian interests. The Banana is
in the crosshairs, and a ceasefire now would be an egregious compromise when
victory on the ground is in sight.
The
sense of urgency that Washington feels to end the war - mainly by
yanking furiously on the oil lever until the Kremlin cries uncle - stems from
the fact that this is now the only sort of victory that Ukraine can hope to
win. The ground war has been written off as a total loss, and all that remains
is to lob missiles and drones at Russian refineries, sanction Russian firms and
banks, and harass shadow tankers until the costs become intolerable. The longer
the Ukrainian ground forces can hold the line the better, but this is merely a
matter of limiting the downside. The fact that Russia can retaliate
disproportionately against Ukraine barely factors into this thinking.
The key
point here, however, is that the concept of Ukrainian victory has been
completely transformed. There is now no real discussion of how Ukraine can win
on the ground. For the Ukrainian bloc, the war is no longer a contest
against the Russian Army, but a more abstract contest against Russia’s
willingness to incur strategic costs. Rather than preventing Russian capture of
the Donbas, the west is testing how much Putin is willing to pay for it.
If history is any guide, a game predicated on outlasting Russia’s strategic
endurance and willingness to fight is a very bad game to play indeed.
ORIGINS OF THE WAR
LEAKER EXPOSES
PENTAGON’S HIDDEN TRUTHS OF UKRAINE WAR AND US WORLD DOMINATION.
Leaked
Pentagon Documents Reveal Secrets About ...
The
New York Times https://www.nytimes.com ›
explain › russia-ukraine-wa... Apr 8,
2023.
Forwarded
by Sonny San Juan via uark.onmicrosoft.com
. . .In plain language therefore, the documents are
real and that is why Jack Teixeira was hunted down within a space of a few days
and was brought to book. But the gain that we have received as the public out
of these documents is a clear picture of what is going on in Ukraine and around
the world concerning conflicts, wars and peace efforts.
For
too long, we have relied on politicians driven by their interests and biased
media who all have been providing distorted reports, exaggerations and
minimisations about instances of violence, occupation, power and future
projections about important issues such as the world economy.
Three
things are now clear from these leaks.
Firstly, the
US is highly involved in the invasion of Ukraine together with NATO. Their
occupation of the Russian territory, the Eastern Europe border and the rest of
Global North is a continuation of decades and centuries of imperialism, settler colonialism and genocide in the
region. To achieve these evil deeds across many generations – from the Cold
War, to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, and up to the
present times – they have used wars and sanctions as weapons to dominate and
control the colonised territories.
The coalition
of the US and NATO to invade countries, steal land, occupy, kill and drive
regime change in the name of protecting human rights is not a new
phenomenon. In 2011, the US and NATO both invaded Libya, killing innocent
civilians and children in the process, and they again drove regime change
activities when US President Barack Obama executed the assassination of Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi.
Till
today, Libya has never been the same place again. It is now ravaged by high
levels of poverty, disease, malnutrition and child mortality. The International
Criminal Court has never issued warrants of arrests against Barack Obama,
Hillary Clinton and Anders Fogh Rasmussen for committing these war crimes.
Today,
Russia under President Putin has finally decided to use its own military force
to resist this NATO-US cruel invasion of Ukraine and its territory – similarly
to how the anti-apartheid movement of Palestine also decided to fight for its
own land by taking up arms to fight against the settler colonialist state of
Israel. Russia is involved in a war of resistance, an anti-Western war aimed at
resisting and dismantling the neocolonial domination coalition of the US, the
UK, the EU and NATO.
Secondly, the
Pentagon leaks show that the coalition of the US and NATO was caught unprepared
to stand against Russian forces. In addition, the Ukraine military itself is
very small, inexperienced and so disorganised to match the force of the Russian
military. This information is so different from the false public statements
that have been made by Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelenskyy lately who present
their side as being more powerful against Russian forces in the battlefield.
Thirdly, the
Pentagon leaks shows that the US is spying on everyone involved in Ukraine –
including its own allies. The US and NATO have huge egos of violent dominant
and they want to perpetuate the war for as long as possible. They have no
interest in ceasefire and peace agreements despite the devastating cost of the
war on the people of Ukraine.
The
Ukraine leadership is fully aware of this and it is willing to cooperate with
US-NATO military violence propaganda in order to gain economic and political
benefits from other Western allies in the EU – even if it means putting the
lives of its people and children to achieve its selfish interests.
As Dr
Matteo Capasso argued in the People’s Forum in New York last week, people must
not be surprised when Ukraine leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy earns a Nobel Peace
Prize soon for cooperating with the colonial intentions of the US and NATO on
Russia. This is the same Nobel Peace Prize that was given to the biggest war
criminals such as Barack Obama and the biggest Israel apologists and apartheid
genocide architects such as FW De Klerk.
Therefore,
the public needs to now understand that the war in Ukraine is supported by the
EU, the US, NATO and all colonial powers as a proxy war to continue the Western domination of the world. The main
target of the US in this conflict is China
– and they are willing to use all means necessary to dethrone it, even if
it means utilising nuclear weapons when their losses become more desperate. The
sudden interest of the US in neighbouring Taiwan is the beginning of a gateway
to occupy a vulnerable territory that can be used to invade China in the name
of protecting human rights.
The US
has realised that it is losing its world dominance to the alternative world
order that China is providing in alliance with Russia and the rest of the
Global South where the world’s majority resides supports an alternative world
but they remain silenced with sanctions and threats of disinvestment.
This
is precisely why South Africa, a BRICS partner under neocolonised Africa, is
unable to speak confidently and in condemnation of the US-NATO war in Ukraine. Our
domestic media perpetuates the Western propaganda of presenting Russia as the
evil of the world that is responsible for the energy crisis and rising
living costs. The Western agenda is actually much bigger and we must seek
alternative sources of information to pay attention.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022%E2%80%932023_Pentagon_document_leaks
“Documentary Video: Ukraine on Fire
- Oliver Stone.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwZApPCFXIc
Ukraine.
Across its eastern border is Russia and to its west-Europe. For centuries, it
has been at the center of a tug-of-war between powers seeking to control its
rich lands and access to the Black Sea. 2014's Maidan Massacre triggered a
bloody uprising that ousted president Viktor Yanukovych and painted Russia as
the perpetrator by Western media. But was it? "Ukraine on Fire" by
Igor Lopatonok provides a historical perspective for the deep divisions in the region which lead to the 2004 Orange Revolution, 2014
uprisings, and the violent overthrow of democratically elected Yanukovych.
Covered by Western media as a people's revolution, it was in fact a coup d'état
scripted and staged by nationalist groups and the U.S. State Department.
Investigative journalist Robert Parry reveals how U.S.-funded political
NGOs and media companies have emerged since the 80s replacing the CIA in
promoting America's geopolitical agenda abroad.
Isaac Chotiner. “Why
John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine.” [Chotiner for The
New Yorker interviews Mearsheimer]
For years, the political scientist has claimed that Putin’s aggression
toward Ukraine is caused by Western intervention. Have recent events changed
his mind? https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
“He is not going to
conquer all of Ukraine,” Mearsheimer says, of Putin. “It would be a blunder of
colossal proportions to try to do that.”Photograph by Adam Berry
/ Getty
The political scientist John Mearsheimer has been one of
the most famous critics of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold
War. Perhaps best known for the book he wrote with Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Mearsheimer is a proponent of great-power politics—a
school of realist international relations that assumes that, in a
self-interested attempt to preserve national security, states will preëmptively
act in anticipation of adversaries. For years, Mearsheimer has argued that the
U.S., in pushing to expand nato eastward
and establishing friendly relations with Ukraine, has increased the likelihood
of war between nuclear-armed powers and
laid the groundwork for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive position
toward Ukraine. Indeed, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote
that “the United States and its European allies share most of the
responsibility for this crisis.”
[Support The New Yorker’s
award-winning journalism. Subscribe today »]
The current invasion of Ukraine has
renewed several long-standing debates about the relationship between the U.S.
and Russia. Although many critics of Putin have argued that he would pursue an
aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western
involvement, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the U.S. is at fault for
provoking him. I recently spoke with Mearsheimer by phone. During our
conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed
whether the current war could have been prevented, whether it makes sense to
think of Russia as an imperial power, and Putin’s ultimate plans for Ukraine.
Looking at the situation
now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?
The Russians made it unequivocally
clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew
a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is
that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a
Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the
strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning
Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective,
this is an existential threat. . . .MORE
NAZIS IN UKRAINE
Saheli Chowdhury. “Successive Governments in Ukraine
have accommodated Nazis to counter Soviet nostalgia: Ukrainian Communist Dmitri
Kovalevich.” (Interview) Mronline.org ( 4-19-23).
Dmitri Kovalevich described a range of issues to Orinoco Tribune, including the 2014
coup, Ukrainian President Zelensky’s rise to fame, war crimes and human rights
violations in Ukraine, the economic collapse of the country, and many others.
The Right-wing
Origins of the Ukraine War
Documentary: "Ukraine - The
Masks of the revolution" by Paul Moreira. English Subs. https://vimeo.com/163237577
A
Look at Ukraine’s Dark Side. February 7, 2016.
https://consortiumnews.com/2016/02/07/a-look-at-ukraines-dark-side/
Gilbert Doctorow. “Exclusive: Americans have been carefully
shielded from the ugly underbelly of Ukraine’s Maidan uprising in
2014 that overthrew the elected president and installed a U.S.-backed, fiercely
anti-Russian regime which has unleashed armed neo-Nazis. But a French
documentary has dared to expose this grim reality, as Gilbert Doctorow
describes.” A new French documentary depicts a long-denied truth that
Ukraine is in the grip of extreme right-wing nationalists who seek to impose
what the British scholar Richard Sakwa has called a monist view of nationhood,
one which does not accept minorities or heterogeneity. Rainbow politics is not
what the Maidan uprising was all about.
Like the Communism which
held power in Ukraine before 1992, this new extreme nationalism can impose its
will only by violence or the threat of violence. It is by definition the
antithesis of European values of tolerance and multiculturalism.
Sen. John McCain appearing with
Ukrainian rightists of the Svoboda party at a pre-coup rally in Kiev.
This intimidation is
what Paul Moreira’s Canal+ documentary, “Ukraine: The Masks of
Revolution,” shows us graphically, frame by frame. That this repression
happens to take place under an ideology that incorporates elements of fascism
if not Nazism is incidental but not decisive to the power of the documentary.
[Click here for
the documentary in French; here for a segment with
English subtitles.]
But what Moreira shows
as surprising as the contents may be to a Western audience actually represents
very basic journalism, reporting on events that are quite well known inside
Ukraine even as this dark underbelly of the Maidan “revolution” has been hidden
from most Europeans and Americans.
Moreira is a
professional documentary filmmaker, not an area specialist. He has done films
in many countries including Iraq, Israel, Burma and Argentina. He says at the
start of this Canal+ documentary that he was drawn to the subject of Ukraine’s
Maidan uprising because he “felt sympathy for these people who demonstrated day
after day on the streets in winter conditions.
“They wanted to join
Europe, to move away from Russia. They wanted the corrupt President [Viktor]
Yanukovych to leave. They hoped for more justice, fewer inequalities. But I was
struck by one thing the images of the American diplomat [Victoria] Nuland on
Maidan distributing bread. The Free World, its cameras, sided with the
insurgents.”
There were also the
discordant images of neo-Nazi symbols and flags. To assess the post-Maidan
Ukraine, Moreira decided to go see for himself.
The documentary draws
upon his interviews with leaders of the rightist paramilitary groups and
extreme nationalist politicians as well as other Ukrainians on both sides of
the conflict. He shows the attacks on police by Maidan street fighters before
Yanukovych’s overthrow on Feb. 22, 2014, and the May 2, 2014 massacre in Odessa
of 46 Russian-speaking demonstrators who opposed the new regime.
He shows a violent
protest by nationalist extremists outside the parliament in Kiev and the recent
blockade by the Right Sektor militias stopping food and other goods crossing
into Crimea, which voted overwhelmingly after the 2014 putsch to leave Ukraine
and rejoin Russia. The Crimean blockade was in violation of Ukrainian
government policy but was not stopped by the Kiev authorities. . . . [This long article contains much on
right-wing influence in Ukraine.]
Doctorow is the European Coordinator, American Committee for East
West Accord, Ltd. His latest
book Does Russia Have a Future?
(August 2015) is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and
affiliated websites. For donations to support the European activities of ACEWA,
write to eastwestaccord@gmail.com. © Gilbert Doctorow, 2015
ENDING THE WAR 12 articles
Ritter's
Rant 042: Give Peace a Chance
Real
Scott itter <scottritter+ritters-rant@substack.com> Aug 19, 2025.
. “Ritter's Rant 042: Give Peace a Chance.” August 19, 2025. John Lennon sang about it. It's time to turn his words into reality.
©
2025 Scott Ritter45 Dover Drive, Delmar, New York, 12054
NORMAN SOLOMON. “Democrats should give peace a chance in Ukraine “
Read this article by
Norman Solomon. Take action here.
Anatol
Lieven. “Trump-Putin call is a positive step towards
peace. ACURA (March 21, 2025).
Trump did
not agree to Russia’s prior demand that during a ceasefire the US
stop arms supplies to Ukraine. For any US and European critics of Trump who are
still capable of thinking objectively about the peace process, this should lead
them to question the hysterical condemnations of the US President as
a “traitor” and “Putin ally”.
Read in browser »
ALASKA
SUMMIT
“Pursuing Fake Peace:
Alaska Summit Shows just How Intellectually Peace-poor the Western World Has
Become.”
Jan Oberg,
Ph.D. Transnational Foundation. TRANSCEND Media Service.
16 Aug 2025 – Perhaps the most amazing thing is
that media, commentators and many others seem to believe that peace might
appear from such a bread and circus show.
Read more...
Nicolai Petro. “For
peace in Ukraine, Russia needs ‘security guarantees’ too.” ACURA (Aug 25, 2025).
Rather than seeking security
for all, Europe is still seeking partial security, only for Ukraine. This
short-sightedness stems from the desire to punish Russia, which argues that it
is only defending its national interests.
Read
in browser »
VIDEO. Nicolai Petro. “Political Collapse Is Inevitable: NATO
Can’t Save Ukraine.” ACURA (July 08, 2025).
Dr. Nicolai Petro, a Professor of Political
Science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the book The
Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict
Resolution talks with Pascal Lottaz on the most recent developments
in Ukraine. Read in browser »
VIDEO. Kelley Vlahos. “Peace or Utter Collapse? Zelensky Holds
Ukraine’s Fate in his Hands.” ACURA (Aug 24, 2025).
Qi’s Kelley Vlahos interviews two well known analysts
of the Ukraine war: James Carden is a writer and publisher of The
Realist Review. Mike Vlahos is a senior fellow at the Institute for
Peace and Diplomacy and a weekly contributor on the John Batchelor Show. Read
in browser »
VIDEO: Chas Freeman.
“Why Trump is Willing to Give So Much to Putin.
ACURA (Mar 21, 2025).
Why is Trump being so agreeable to Russia? And
why is Putin so eager to end the war through peace dealings, contrary to
people’s perception of him wanting to conquer Ukraine?
Read in browser »
Muzzling the dogs of war: The time to stop the madness is
now. Editor. mronline.org (7-4-24).
Originally published: Pearls and Irritations on July 2,
2024 by Eugene Doyle (more by Pearls
and Irritations)
(Posted Jul 03, 2024)
Imperialism, Inequality, State Repression, WarAmericas, Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United StatesNewswireNorth Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Russia-Ukraine War
It may be time to think the unthinkable: all the signs are
pointing to the West preparing to launch a proper war in Europe. Once started
it could bring, for the first time in living memory, millions of Western
civilians into uniform and see the cities of the West attacked. Preposterous?
Jumping the Shark? Listen to what the leaders in the West are saying. The time
to stop the madness is now, not once the elites drive us into the abyss and
civilians are stripped of all rights to oppose.
“How China can prevent climate
catastrophe? Moving humanity toward global ecological civilization.” David
Schwartzman. Mronline.org
(4-12-23).
As the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report tells us, there is still a chance to keep warming at no
more than the 1.5°C target, but tipping points to climate catastrophes much
worse than we are witnessing now will kick in if this target is breached. It is
now crystal clear that ongoing wars, in
particular the Ukraine war, create huge obstacles to the global cooperation
necessary for any chance of meeting the 1.5°C warming target. Following the
lead of China’s peace plan, we should support the call for an immediate ceasefire in the Ukraine war, and for all parties
involved to negotiate.
“U.S.
sizes up Ukraine arms stand of Israel” (Arkansas Democrat-Gazette), Apr 10,
2023. U.S. sizes up Ukraine
arms stand of Israel. COMPILED
BY DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE STAFF FROM WIRE REPORTS.
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.
Apr 10, 2023. Leaked file gives scenarios for sending
lethal weapons. Read more...
Austrian lawmakers
walk out during Zelensky address to parliament
Originally published: Al Mayadeen on March 30, 2023 by Agencies (more by Al Mayadeen) | (Posted Mar 31, 2023)
https://mronline.org/2023/03/31/austrian-lawmakers-walk-out-during-zelensky-address-to-parliament/
Austrian lawmakers from the opposition Freedom Party
(FPOe) walked out of the lower house of Austria’s parliament
during a virtual address by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The politicians stressed that they were opposing the speech
because it disregarded Austria’s neutrality principle.
Zelensky, who is begging for more lethal weapons ahead
of an expected counteroffensive this
spring, joined Austria’s lower house’s morning session via video link.
Little signs with the party insignia and the phrases “space
for neutrality” or “space for peace” were left on the desks of lawmakers who
left the chamber.
FPOe leader Herbert Kickl told journalists that Zelensky’s
address violates Austria’s neutrality principle.
It is worth noting that a protest was held outside the parliament building
prior to the speech, demanding an upholding of the principle of neutrality.
The big picture
When countries such as Switzerland and
Sweden abandoned their neutrality policies under NATO’s pressure, one country
refused to bend.
Austria has
recently become the center of a heated debate about its neutrality, with
detractors suggesting that it should send military supplies to Ukraine. Earlier
this month, an open letter inked by Austrian politician and First
Vice-President of the European Parliament Othmar Karas urged for a shift in
Austria’s security strategy.
Austrians have always regarded neutrality as part of their
identity and wish to remain as disconnected from global politics as possible.
It is worth noting that the current Chancellor Karl Nehammer was the first and
only European to visit Moscow following the start of the war, while Austria’s
President, Alexander van der Bellen, visited Kiev.
Maintaining communication connections with all sides is
consistent with Vienna’s overall foreign policy strategy.
With the war entering its second year, there is mounting
international pressure to show stronger support for Ukraine and take a harsher
position against Russia.
All of this points to wider unresolved issues among NATO
member states, which must contend with the fact that some states, such as Austria, do
not perceive the Union as a cohesive geopolitical actor.
Gilbert
Achcar. “Washington Is
Obstructing the Path to a Political Settlement in Ukraine.” Truthout.
(Sent to me by Prof. Sonny San Juan, Wash. Dc,
5-3-23.)
The way President Joe Biden’s administration reacted to China’s
offer to facilitate a political settlement of the Ukraine conflict
clearly reveals Washington’s undeclared objective regarding that war. The
contrast between the administration’s attitude toward China’s position and the
attitudes of some of the United States’s allies is striking.
When Beijing published its “Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” on
February 24, marking the beginning of the second year since Russia launched its
invasion of Ukraine [in response to half-a-dozen provocations, all exposed
repeatedly in these anthologies --D,],
Washington immediately dismissed the initiative as a mere decoy, with President Biden telling ABC’s
David Muir, “Putin’s applauding it, so how could it be any good?” He then
added, “I’ve seen nothing in the plan that would indicate that there is
something that would be beneficial to anyone other than Russia, if the Chinese
plan were followed.”
And yet, other leaders saw what Biden couldn’t see — or
didn’t want to see — which is that the very first of the Chinese declaration’s
12 points reaffirmed a principle that went against Russia’s interest in the
ongoing war and in favor of Ukraine’s; namely, the principle of “sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of all countries.”
This is indeed why Russian President Vladimir Putin did not
“applaud” China’s position, contrary to Biden’s claim. In the joint statements
to the press that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping gave on March 21,
during Xi’s recent visit to Moscow, the Russian president declared, “We
believe that many of the provisions of the peace plan put forward by China are
consonant with Russian approaches and can be taken as the basis for a peaceful
settlement.” Many of the provisions — in other words, not all of them. https://truthout.org/articles/washington-is-obstructing-the-path-to-a-political-settlement-in-ukraine/
Whereas Putin could fully support provisions such as
“abandoning the Cold War mentality” (point two) and “stopping unilateral
sanctions” (point 10), he could obviously not subscribe to the need to respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, nor to point eight
that states, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy understood that
quite well for his part. In blatant contradiction with Biden’s
assessment, he declared on
the day China’s position was released, “China is talking about us…. I think
what they are saying looks like respect for territorial integrity. It doesn’t
mention the country, but it’s our territorial integrity that has been breached.
Nuclear security was mentioned as well. I think this is in line with the
interests — global interests and Ukrainian interests.” It is this very
different attitude that allowed the April 26 phone call between Xi and
Zelenskyy to happen, which Ukraine’s president commented as
follows:
There is an opportunity to use China’s political
influence to restore the strength of the principles and rules on which peace
should be based. Ukraine and China, as well as the vast majority of the world,
are equally interested in the strength of the sovereignty of nations and
territorial integrity…. In compliance with the main security rules, in
particular, the inadmissibility of threats with nuclear weapons and the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world.
In fact, China did mention Ukraine specifically more than
once when talking about territorial integrity. In explaining China’s official
position on the war two days into the Russian invasion, on February 26, 2022,
then-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi clearly stated that,
“China stands for respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all countries and earnestly abiding by the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter. China’s position is consistent and clear, and it also
applies to the Ukraine issue.”
A few days later, on March 5, Wang reiterated the
same to his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Ten days
later, Qin Gang, China’s then-ambassador to the U.S. and its present foreign
minister, published a piece in The Washington Post clearly stating
that, “The sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including
Ukraine, must be respected.”
One key reason why Washington has closed its ear to
Beijing’s implicit repudiation of the Russian invasion is, of course, that it
does not want to hear what goes along with the Chinese position, especially the
above-mentioned provisions that Putin could happily endorse but also China’s
first point that also stated: “Universally recognized international law,
including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
must be strictly observed.… Equal and uniform application of international law
should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected.”
After all, the very idea of respecting the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of all countries is alien to Washington
as much as it is to Moscow. Whereas Washington champions these three principles
against Russia in the case of Ukraine, it has violated them over time more than
any other government and continues to do so — by means of drone and missile
strikes, even if not by deploying troops on the ground since the 2021 Afghan debacle.
Contrasting reactions to Xi’s visit to Moscow last March
followed the same pattern: condemnation on Washington’s part, along with
insisting prophecies of imminent delivery of weapons by Beijing to Russia,
whereas European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell, the high
representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, commented that
Xi’s visit “reduces the risk of nuclear war” because the Chinese
president has “made it very, very clear” to Putin that he wants “to minimize
the risk of being associated with the Russian military intervention” — a
comment that has hardly been reported by the media. Taking the opposite view to
Washington’s prophecies, Borrell added that Chinese leaders “are not engaged
militarily and there is no sign that they want to engage militarily.”
The very idea of respecting
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries is
alien to Washington as much as it is to Moscow. . . .
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GILBERT ACHCAR Gilbert
Achcar is the author of The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China, from Kosovo to
Ukraine.
END UKRAINE WAR ANTHOLOGY #36.
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