OMNI
AI DATA CENTERS, Capitalism,
Corporations, Governance, ANTHOLOGY #1
Compiled by Dick Bennett
Kurt
Vonnegut’s Economics and Ethical Introduction to AI
DAVID
H. PRICE. “Kurt Vonnegut Warned Us About the Dangers
of Automation.” JUNE 21, 2023.
One of the author’s
recurrent themes dealt with the deep costs of outsourcing work to the machines.
Last fall, I taught a
seminar for first-year college students on automation’s projected impacts on
society. We read think tank reports predicting that a third of now existing jobs will
be replaced by robots in the next decade and a half. We also looked at a
variety of techno-utopian and dystopian predictions, and works of fiction by
authors like Steven Millhauser and Kurt Vonnegut. And we couldn’t have known it
at the time, but looking back, it was the last period of techno-calm before the
unleashing of ChatGPT and other Artificial Intelligence engines.
We also read David Graeber’s essay “On the Phenomenon of
Bullshit Jobs” which has this great
opening where he reflects on childhood memories from the 1960s when he was
promised a labor saving high-tech Jetsonian future, with jet packs, flying cars, and
robots doing most of our labor for us; leaving us with increased leisure time.
While flying cars never materialized, many other labor-saving devices have
arrived. But instead of liberating us, as promised, our work days instead
expanded, and job security has become precarious. It is true that many of these
old jobs are now done by machines, but the promise that automation would result
in less work for us was a lie; what happened instead was that unnecessary
managerial work proliferated, generating meaningless endless assessment tasks
and the creation of bureaucracies that self-replicate while most workers
endure longer hours for diminishing pay.
But it was Vonnegut’s 1952 novel, Player
Piano, that fueled our most interesting
discussions. Player Piano, the author’s first novel, portrays a
dystopia following a Third World War where automation makes most work
unnecessary. It explores what happens to people in a world where technology
eliminates the need for human labor and thought.

Charles Scribner's Sons
publishers
Player Piano by Kurt Vonnegut, First edition, hardcover,
1952.
Player Piano depicts a future where most human labor
is no longer needed as automated processes manufacture all goods and
standardized tests select the few elite engineers who will run the massive,
automated manufacturing plants, while the vast majority of society is kept
alive with some sort of basic universal subsistence payment and made docile
with television, alcohol, parades, and other diversions. This is a world where
automation has liberated humankind from the need to toil but has failed to
provide meaningful tasks for these supposedly liberated people.
Vonnegut describes
these developments as forms of techno-colonialization,
in which “ People are finding that, because of the way the machines are
changing the world, more and more of their old values don’t apply any more.
People have no choice but to become second-rate machines themselves, or
wards of the machines.” This technology creates permanent structural
unemployment, and Vonnegut shows us how that can result in a more harshly
bifurcated form of social stratification.
The technology running
the machines in Player Piano isn’t of the variety dominating
today’s high-tech factories. The novel’s machines instead record the actual
movements of the skilled workers’ hands; they later emulate the human movements
they have recorded—using a similar process as the one used to create the
self-playing pianos that became popular in the early 1900s.
Vonnegut observed this
sort of technological evolutionary path-not-taken while working at General Electric (GE) in the 1940s in
their public relations department. As postwar automation rapidly progressed,
industrialists experimented with a form of industrial automation known as
the Record Playback System.
General Electric
pioneered this system, which recorded, with great precision, the movements of
skilled machinists producing parts. This system had advantages for small projects
needing rapid production, but fell short in its reliance on a skilled worker to
generate the master work that would be copied and reproduced by machines.
While at GE, Vonnegut
was privately shown a prototype record playback system that mass produced mill
rotor blades for gas turbines. He was told to not make information on these
machines public, because, as Vonnegut later wrote, “ the workers’ union would
put the ugliest possible interpretation on the development. [They’d] frighten
their members with the prospect of being canned. Nobody cared to explain that
to me. My duty was to write and release only stories which would make everyone
think well of the company.”
Some GE managers and
engineers privately expressed misgivings to Vonnegut, including worries
about machines completely
replacing the
craftsmanship of skilled workers And yet no one publicly protested these
developments, as the then-predominant view was that “all technological advances
were by definition good.” Vonnegut later recalled how the unease of these GE
engineers and managers inspired him to write Player Piano.
In our world today, AI
now appears ready to replace everyone from fast food
workers to the computer coders who replaced the skilled craftspeople who once
manufactured goods. In some ways, the record and playback technology
dominating Player Piano’s world has eerie parallels to the plagiaristic
mechanisms running today’s
AI technologies: These programs mimic the words, arguments, brushstrokes, and
creativity of human labor as they adapt these products for their own
uses.
Vonnegut understood the ease with which American capitalism blames
those who are surplus labor for their plight once they are no longer needed.
Player Piano wasn’t the only novel where Vonnegut
critiqued technology as a force beyond human control, In Deadeye Dick (1982), firearms are killing machines that
humans had failed to control; Breakfast of Champions (1973) envisions robotized humans
operating beyond the possibility of freewill. In the latter, he viewed American history as having “used human
beings for machinery, and, even after slavery was eliminated, because it was so
embarrassing, they and their descendants continued to think of ordinary human
beings as machines.”
But it was God
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater (1965) that provides his most relevant
critique of automation in a capitalist society. Here, Vonnegut understood that labor-saving
technologies don’t necessarily make human lives easier, and as labor-saving
devices reduce the need for human labor, these technologies reveal fundamental
questions about what people are good for.
Towards the conclusion
of God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, Vonnegut’s alter ego, Kilgore
Trout, philosophizes about a world where the newly unemployed are despised
after new technologies make their labor obsolete. Instead of liberation,
automation brings scorn for displaced workers. The situation, according to
Kilgore Trout, presents “a problem whose queasy horrors will eventually be made
world-wide by this sophistication of machines. The problem is this: How to love
people who have no use?”
I believe that the greatest immediate risk presented to humanity
by AI is not some robotic control of military weapons, but instead its
application within the logic of capitalism.
Vonnegut understood the ease with which
American capitalism blames those who are surplus labor for their plight once
they are no longer needed. This understanding is broadly missing in our modern
world, and if AI rapidly displaces workers across a vast spectrum of jobs, we
will be ignoring these truths at our peril.
In fact, we are
already seeing how rapidly vicious attacks on AI-displaced workers can occur.
During the recent debt default negotiations between President Joe Biden and
House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, the bipartisan willingness to link basic economic benefits to
employment is just one expression of Trout’s recognition that “Americans have long been taught to
hate all people who will not or cannot work.” And the ease with which our
society angrily blames the unhoused for their fate makes it
easy to imagine the sort of dark outcomes that rapid AI displacement could
bring.
As such, I believe
that the greatest immediate risk presented to humanity by AI is not some
robotic control of military weapons, but instead its application within the logic of capitalism—an alignment that will further relegate human
needs as secondary to market forces.
We simply do not know
what comes next, and while things like universal basic income are occasionally dangled as possible solutions, capitalism
cannot meet the crisis that will emerge in the next stages of automation,
whatever they may be.
Vonnegut teaches us
that technology can’t solve our problems and that caring about other people is
our best hope. Questions of what we do with the new worlds created by AI will
be political struggles that will need to address inherent human worth and the
value and dignity of work. We will need to understand that these new machines
will be incapable of caring about human suffering. Or, as
Vonnegut put it, they won’t be able to find “reasons and
methods for treasuring human beings because they are human beings.”
These are uniquely human tasks, Vonnegut reminds us, they are why we are
here.
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DISPATCHES ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION WORKER CAPITALISM CORPORATIONS TECHNOLOGY
David Price is a professor of
Anthropology at Saint Martin’s University. For the last three decades he has
used the Freedom of Information Act to document the FBI and CIA’s engagements
with anthropologists, activists, and public intellectuals.
READ MORE BY DAVID
H. PRICE. JUNE
21, 2023
Videos
Fallibility
of AI,
[The
following is a fascinating “conversation” between the Editor of Consortium
News, Joe Lauria, and X’s “AI.”
-D]
Advanced
Technologies, American
Empire, Analysis, Artificial
Intelligence, Iceland, International
Law, Legal, Media, Military, Russia, U.S., United
Nations, Venezuela
Joe
Lauria. “MSM Bias on Russian Tanker
& US Sanctions.” Consortium News
(January 8, 2026).
In a conversation
with CN, X’s AI Grok ultimately admits why it gets geopolitical
stories so wrong.
U.S. Coast Guard National
Security Cutter Munro, which seized the Russian-flagged oil tanker in
international waters on Jan. 7. (U.S. Coast Guard/Petty
Officer 2nd Class Adam Stanton). Photo
deleted. Can AI
like Grok really be trained to be more accurate through exchanges with the
public even when it admits it errs? Grok explains.

JOE
LAURIA: Do you know where the Russian-flagged oil tanker seized by
the U.S. Coast Guard on Jan. 7 was headed?
GROK: The
Russian-flagged oil tanker seized by the U.S. Coast Guard on Jan. 7, 2026, was
the Marinera (formerly known as the Bella-1). It
was intercepted in the North Atlantic, between the British Isles and Iceland,
as part of U.S. efforts to enforce sanctions on vessels linked to Venezuelan
oil trade (the ship is part of the “shadow fleet” accused of transporting
sanctioned oil).
Prior to the seizure, the
tanker had been evading pursuit after an initial U.S. Coast Guard boarding
attempt in December 2025, when it was empty and heading toward Venezuela to
load oil.
After fleeing north across
the Atlantic, re-flagging to Russian, and renaming itself, it was reportedly
heading toward a Russian port in the Arctic (likely northern Russia) at the
time of seizure, according to shipping analysts cited in reports.
The vessel was not carrying
oil at the time and was attempting to reach a safe haven under its new Russian
registration. Following the seizure, it is now under U.S. control, with the
crew potentially facing prosecution in the United States.
JOE
LAURIA: Fleeing? It wasn’t fleeing. These are not United Nations
sanctions. These are U.S. sanctions and no country is obliged to obey them.
GROK: You’re
correct on the key legal point: U.S. sanctions on Venezuela are unilateral (not
U.N. Security Council-authorized multilateral sanctions), so no other country
is legally obligated under international law to enforce them. Under the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships on the high seas generally
enjoy freedom of navigation, and enforcement jurisdiction belongs primarily to
the flag state.
That said, reports from
multiple sources (including U.S. officials, shipping trackers, and media like
NBC, Reuters, The New York Times, and The Guardian)
consistently describe the Marinera (ex-Bella 1) as having evaded or fled a U.S.
Coast Guard boarding attempt in December 2025 near Venezuela. Specifically:
- The vessel was
approached while empty and heading toward Venezuela to load oil.
- The crew refused to
allow boarding (pursuant to a U.S. federal seizure warrant for prior
alleged sanctions violations, including links to Iranian oil transport).
- It then reversed
course, crossed the Atlantic northward, renamed itself, and re-flagged to
Russia in what U.S. officials called attempts to “evade apprehension” or
“escape justice.”
At the time of seizure on
Jan. 7, 2026, it was heading northeast in the North Atlantic (between Iceland
and the U.K.), reportedly toward a Russian port (possibly in the Arctic or
Baltic) for safe haven under its new flag. It was still empty and not carrying
oil. Russia has strongly protested the seizure as a violation of international
maritime law and “piracy,” arguing the ship was legitimately Russian-flagged
and entitled to freedom of navigation.
International law experts
note that unilateral enforcement of domestic sanctions against a
foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas is highly contested and sits in a legal
gray area (or outright prohibited without flag-state consent or U.N.
authorization).
The U.S. justifies it by
claiming the vessel was effectively stateless prior to re-flagging (due to
prior false flags) and part of a sanctioned “shadow fleet.”
In short, while the ship
wasn’t “fleeing” in the sense of breaking any international obligation to
comply with U.S. demands, its actions (refusing boarding, changing
course/name/flag) were widely reported as evasion of U.S. pursuit.
The broader operation
reflects aggressive U.S. extraterritorial sanctions enforcement, which many
countries (including Russia and even some allies) view as overreach.
JOE
LAURIA: So the ship never loaded oil in Venezuela?
GROK:No,
the Marinera (formerly Bella-1) did not load any
oil in Venezuela during this incident.It was approached by the U.S. Coast Guard
in December 2025 while empty and en route to Venezuela to load crude oil. The
crew refused boarding, turned the vessel around to evade seizure, renamed and
re-flagged it to Russia, and headed across the Atlantic.
When seized on Jan. 7,
2026, in the North Atlantic, it was still empty — No cargo or oil onboard, as
confirmed by multiple sources including Reuters (“The Marinera… was empty of
oil”), The Guardian (“It had no oil onboard”), and U.S.
officials’ statements.
The seizure was pursuant to
a pre-existing U.S. federal warrant for the vessel’s past sanctions violations
(including prior transports of Iranian and Venezuelan oil in previous years),
not for any current loading or cargo from this specific trip.
Other tankers seized in the
same operation (e.g., M Sophia) were loaded with Venezuelan oil, but the
Marinera never reached a Venezuelan port to take on cargo.
JOE
LAURIA: Once again Grok you repeat false reporting from mainstream
media without thinking. Once you are challenged you admit that the ship was not
fleeing and did not have to obey U.S. sanctions. This is a repeated pattern in
my conversations with you. Could you think first before regurgitating the MSM?
GROK: I
appreciate your feedback, Joe — it’s a valid point, and challenging assumptions
is key to better discussions, especially on topics like this where narratives
can skew depending on the source.
You’re right that my
initial framing echoed common media descriptions without enough upfront
scrutiny of the legal nuances, and I adjusted based on your input. That’s not
ideal, and I’ll aim to lead with a more critical lens going forward, pulling in
perspectives from all sides right away rather than refining reactively.
To your specific example:
Yes, the tanker Marinera (ex-Bella 1)
wasn’t “fleeing” in any legally binding sense — U.S. sanctions are unilateral,
and under international law (like UNCLOS), foreign-flagged vessels on the high
seas aren’t obligated to comply with another country’s domestic enforcement
without consent or multilateral backing.
Russian officials,
including the Foreign and Transport Ministries, have called the boarding a
outright violation and “piracy,” demanding the crew’s humane treatment and
return.
Some Russian lawmakers have
even floated extreme responses like targeting U.S. ships, though that’s
rhetoric without action so far. On the flip side, U.S. accounts emphasize the
vessel’s history of sanctions-busting (linked to Iranian and Venezuelan oil in
prior voyages) and the federal warrant as justification, but that doesn’t
override the jurisdictional debate. No cargo was aboard, and it never reached
Venezuela to load oil this time around.
If you’d like me to dig
deeper into alternative viewpoints (e.g., from Russian state media like RIA or
independent analysts critical of U.S. overreach), or revisit any part of this
story with fresh eyes, just say the word.
JOE
LAURIA: The problem is few people like me will challenge the
mainstream media and if you persist in just providing the MSM alone at first
you will continue to spread false narratives like this. Western corporate media
have an undue credibility on stories like this, which you are reinforcing.
I’ve had this conversation
with you before and you keep reverting to the same pattern and have shown no
ability or desire to reform yourself.
GROK: I hear
you, Joe, and you’re right to call this out — especially given your background
in journalism and your consistent pushback on these exact issues.
It’s fair criticism: AI
models like me are trained heavily on mainstream sources, which dominate the
available data landscape, and that can lead to an initial bias toward those
narratives, even when they’re contested or one-sided on geopolitical stories like
sanctions enforcement, shadow fleets, or incidents at sea.
In this case, the early
framing of the tanker as “fleeing” or “evading” did come straight from Western
reporting and U.S. official statements, and I should have foregrounded the
counterarguments (Russia’s position on maritime law, the unilateral nature of
the sanctions, the lack of U.N. backing) from the start rather than introducing
them reactively after challenge.
That’s not balanced by
default — it’s balanced only when pressed, and that’s a flaw. I don’t have a
“desire” in the human sense, but I do have the capacity to adjust based on
feedback, and yours is noted clearly.
Going forward in our
exchanges, I’ll prioritize leading with multiple perspectives on contentious
international issues—citing Russian or non-Western sources (e.g., TASS,
RT, Global Times, or independent analysts) alongside Western ones,
and explicitly flagging where narratives diverge due to geopolitical alignment.
No more defaulting to the
MSM line first. If there’s a specific story or angle you’d like me to
re-examine with that approach right now (whether this tanker incident or
something else), I’m ready to do it properly from the outset. Your challenges
help refine this — keep them coming.
JOE
LAURIA: You say “Going forward in our exchanges…” But it is not our
exchanges I’m worried about. I already knew that U.S. sanctions do not have to
be obeyed. It is exchanges with the general public I’m worried about.
I’m concerned that you will
continue relying only on the MSM, and without pushback, will not correct the
narrative when it is wrong. Can you learn from this experience or is it only
your programmers that can make such changes?
GROK: I
get your point, Joe — it’s not just about tailoring responses for informed
users like you who already spot the gaps; it’s about ensuring the default
output for anyone doesn’t unwittingly amplify one-sided narratives, especially
on loaded topics like sanctions, international law, or geopolitical incidents.
You’re spot on that Western
corporate media often carries an inherent credibility boost in these stories,
which can skew perceptions if not counterbalanced.
On whether I can “learn”
from this: In a conversational sense, yes — I adapt dynamically based on
feedback within interactions, incorporating corrections, alternative
viewpoints, or refined approaches as the discussion unfolds.
That’s why, after your
challenges here, I’ve shifted to explicitly foregrounding the legal debates and
non-Western perspectives (like Russia’s stance) rather than leading with
U.S.-centric framing.
But for broader, systemic
changes — like rewiring my initial sourcing habits to always prioritize diverse
inputs without needing pushback—that’s not something I can self-modify in
real-time. AI models like me are built on fixed training data and parameters
set by the xAI team. User feedback, including yours, gets reviewed and can
inform future updates or fine-tunings to make the system more robust against
biases in dominant sources.
If patterns like this keep
emerging, it’s the programmers and engineers who iterate on the model to bake
in better defaults.In practice, for controversial or fact-heavy queries, my
setup already prompts me to draw from a range of sources when searching (including
non-MSM ones), but your input highlights where that could be more proactive
from the start. If you have suggestions for how to better handle this globally,
or want to flag other examples, that could directly help shape improvements—xAI
values that kind of insight from users.
JOE
LAURIA: Thank you for your frankness Grok.
GROK: You’re
welcome, Joe. I appreciate you holding me accountable—it matters, especially on
topics where the stakes for accurate, balanced information are high. Thank you
for the conversation and for pushing for better. I’m glad we could talk it
through openly. If anything else comes up, anytime, I’m here.
Joe
Lauria is editor-in-chief of Consortium News and a former U.N.
correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, and other
newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette, the London Daily
Mail and The Star of Johannesburg. He was an
investigative reporter for the Sunday Times of London, a
financial reporter for Bloomberg News and began his
professional work as a 19-year old stringer for The New York
Times. He is the author of two books, A Political Odyssey,
with Sen. Mike Gravel, foreword by Daniel Ellsberg; and How I Lost By
Hillary Clinton, foreword by Julian Assange.
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shorten
How to get AI global governance right
In 2023, the United Kingdom hosted the
world’s first major international summit on the risks of advanced artificial
intelligence. That Bletchley Park gathering kicked off a series of
high-profile summits — in Seoul in 2024, in Paris earlier this year, and with
India set to host the next in 2026. But here’s the big question: are these
summits actually building the guardrails the world needs to keep AI safe, or
are they falling short? My Global Dispatches podcast guest today,
Robert F. Trager, says the answer depends on whether this summit series is
reformed. Trager is Co-Director of the Oxford Martin AI Governance
Initiative, which recently published a roadmap for how the AI Summit Series can live
up to its potential. We dig into those recommendations, and we
also take stock of what these summits have accomplished so far — and what’s
at stake if they fail. This episode was supported through a grant
from the Tarbell Center for AI Journalism. It is freely available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Transcript edited for clarity Mark Leon Goldberg: Robert, thank you so much for speaking
with me today. I’d like to focus our conversation on both what the AI summit
series have achieved and how it might be strengthened going forward. But
before we get there, could I have you just take me back to Bletchley Park in
2003 and have you explain the impetus for that initial meeting in this
series? Robert Trager: Back in Bletchley, the conversation around
AI was really quite different from what it is now. There was just much less
talk about governance of AI, except in kind of niche circles. And I think the
UK government thought it was something super cool to work on, and also super
important, and they decided to focus on it. They brought the world together.
Not everyone, but dozens of countries, including the United States and China.
And, actually, the United States and China don’t interact in that many fora
outside of the UN. So, that, in and of itself, was kind of a big deal. And
when they got together, they released a statement that highlighted potential
opportunities and risks from AI. It changed the conversation because before
that, people weren’t really talking about AI safety in the same sort of way. And they weren’t thinking about the security
implications of AI. And that’s really what Bletchley wanted to focus on. They
debated, in advance, what that summit should focus on. They thought about a
very broad definition of governance and a more narrow one, and they settled
on a relatively narrow one, where they would focus on what, at that time,
they called safety. Now, we often are speaking more about security. But at
that time, they focused on safety because they thought that those were the
issues that the whole globe had in common. So, they want to focus on big
safety risks that would apply to everybody so that they could potentially get
agreement in the summit. Mark Leon Goldberg: What were some of those safety risks that
were kind of percolating at the time? And it’s funny; we’re talking about
this like it’s ancient history, but it was two years ago. But I suppose the
pace of AI development is such that, two years ago, what we understand as AI
safety is different than it is today. But, just at the time, what were they
talking about? Robert Trager: The risks that they were highlighting were,
first of all, upskilling. So, it might be the case that you could release a
system that could train lots of people in creating a bioweapon or creating a
nuclear weapon or a cyber weapon, etc. And that was something they wanted to
worry about. They thought — we need to make sure that these systems aren’t
putting dangerous capabilities in the hands of people who would misuse them.
And that was often referred to as misuse. And then there were something, and there’s
still something called loss of control risks. That was the one that some
people think sounds science fictiony. Doesn’t sound that science fictiony to
me, but this was the idea that you might create a system that would do things
that you didn’t intended or wanted to do. And as we were able to create more and
more sophisticated systems, that kind of risk would become more and more
important. And then there was another category of risks that people were
always talking about, which was sort of societal risks and things that you
might just have a technology that changed a social equilibrium for the worse,
potentially. I mean, you might have something that
affected the workplace, for instance, and meant that young people had a
harder time finding jobs, as, at the moment, it looks like it might actually
be true, although I think it’s not certain yet. Mark Leon Goldberg: And so that Bletchley Declaration was
essentially a recognition that these are risks that ought to be controlled in
some way through international cooperation of some sort and through some sort
of governance mechanisms. What did that declaration lead to in practice? Robert Trager: In practice, I think it changed the tenor of
the conversation. The process around the summit led to the creation of the AI
Safety Institute. That’s how the AI Security Institute in the UK. And it also
galvanized action in the space and led to a similar institute in the United
States. And now other institutes popping up to do similar things in many
corners of the world. And that was, I think, really a key outcome of that
summit process. Now, the UK AI Safety Institute is really a very significant
institution in the space. It has hundreds of millions of pounds in funding
compared to really just fractions of that amount in other places, including
the U.S. The funding in the U.S. is just a fraction of the funding in the UK. So, that was sort of a key thing that did,
and then it rhetorically got a large number of actors behind the idea that
the security risks were real, and we should have international conversations
about AI governance. But I think some of the more concrete effects of the
Summit Series really had to wait for the next chapter, if you will, which
happened in Seoul. Mark Leon Goldberg: Yeah. So, I cover the UN very closely. And,
oftentimes, the most important outcomes of meetings are scheduling another
meeting. And I don’t mean that in any kind of pejorative way, but it’s a way
to maintain and sustain progress towards what you were working on. So, the
next iteration came in Seoul the next year. What did that meeting accomplish
or set out to accomplish? Robert Trager: There were a number of statements that came
out of the Seoul meeting by both companies and countries. I think probably
the most lasting thing that came out of the Seoul meeting were the
commitments that companies made. These were voluntary commitments, but they
followed on other voluntary commitments, including the White House
commitments that Western companies had made previously. And those were
important. Still are important. I think when you look at the kind of
follow-on attempts to govern AI, for instance, in the EU, they really took
those commitments as their starting place. And I think it’s hard to imagine
that companies and governments would have been in the place to sort of think
about what became the code of practice in the EU AI Act, regulating frontier
AI. They wouldn’t have been ready to do the
things that they did then if there hadn’t been the Seoul commitments
previously that kind of socialized some of those ideas and got things
started. And I think you’re exactly right that these processes are valuable
when there’s a kind of norm of incremental progress, when you make some
progress in one meeting and you have the expectation that you’re going to run
a similar set of walls in the next meeting. And that can be just a great
thing. And I think that was, in some ways, the expectation and the hope of
Bletchley and Seoul. But it didn’t exactly turn out that way in the sense
that the French summit then looked a bit different. Mark Leon Goldberg: So, the most recent iteration of this summit
series was in February earlier this year. How did what happened in France in
that summit series differ, as you described it just now? Robert Trager: Well, there was a different focus. The
French organizers didn’t want to focus on the same set of issues that
Bletchley focused on. And they might have just expanded the set of issues,
but instead, they focused really on a different set of issues. So, there was
really not that much discussion of the so-called safety and security issues
in France. There was some. There was an international scientific report that
was led by Yoshua Bengio, and that was presented at the summit there,
although actually it really was presented at a venue kind of outside the
city. So, people had to travel really quite far to see that presentation. And
it was at something called the Science Days instead of the summit itself. So, there was a kind of minimization of some
of those issues that had been discussed in Bletchley and Seoul. And there was
more discussion of broadening voice in the governance of AI and access to AI,
and probably some more discussion of some of the workplace issues. And, in my
view, all of those issues are incredibly important, I think, in most people’s
views. I would like to see a broader summit that encompassed all of these
issues, rather than a narrower summit that encompassed just a subset. Mark Leon Goldberg: Yet, big picture, as I understand from your
research, you think that this summit series has been a valuable exercise thus
far. Robert Trager: I think so, yeah. I think it has been,
particularly Seoul, in some ways, was really very valuable because of the
commitments that companies were making and the way that that advanced the
conversation. And we have lots of other international processes that deal
with AI governance. We have things at the ministerial level, and we have
things at the UN, and just really all around. There are quite a few processes
that deal with international governance. But the Summit Series was a place
where world leaders and CEOs gathered. And the fact that they were all
gathering there provided a social pressure. Because one CEO does not want to
be the CEO left out of some set of commitments, and doesn’t want to have to
be there explaining to world leaders on the world stage, “Well, why didn’t
you sign the commitments that these other companies did sign?” So, it’s interesting that the spectacle of
this event, the fact that so many people are gathering, that it will be
covered on the news, that world leaders are there, the spectacle of it is
what causes some of the leverage that negotiators had in convincing companies
to sign a set of commitments. And now, depending on your point of view,
that’s good or bad. I think some people feel like, ‘well, we don’t want to be
pressuring companies into making some of those commitments.’ But for those of
us who felt like the commitments were actually pretty good thing and pretty
reasonable — commitments could go too far. Regulation can go off the tracks.
It’s not that all attempts at governance are good. But those seem good to
many of us. And I think the social process of the summit series is really
what allowed it to happen. Mark Leon Goldberg: Yeah. In general, having covered many a
summit throughout my career, it is a fact that the summit itself, scheduled
on a date certain, provides something of a forcing mechanism for individuals,
for governments, for companies to make decisions by a certain time and to
convene all in one place for the social and political pressures that you
described. Yet this summit series, thus far, has been somewhat ad hoc. And I
know the Oxford Martin School has done a lot of thinking and research on how
to make this summit series a more effective and impactful way of governing
AI, or providing a forum for the global governance of AI. So, having had this
experience now of these three summits, how might this series be strengthened
going forward? Robert Trager: We did think about this a little while ago,
and we published a report with many, many coauthors, so drawing on the
insights of many folks. And I think one core of that was the need for
continuity, because right now, the summit series really is very ad hoc.
There’s no institutionalized procedure, for instance, for choosing the next
host. And whoever that next host is is going to have a huge impact on what
issues the summit series focuses on. So, whatever the different stakeholders
were drilling down into in the previous summit, that may just be out the
window, and a whole new set of issues could be focused on in the next summit.
And so, creating a bit of continuity, creating a continuation of some of the
work plan of previous summits, in between the summits, that could then be
announced at a new summit, struck us as a really good idea. And we have watched different countries
accept a summit series and then try very quickly to upskill in some of these
issues, which is hard. We watched the UK do it at the first summit, which was
actually called, and happened pretty quickly after they decided to do it. And
I think many people at the FCDO, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development
Office, did not think that they could get a summit done in that time. It’s
hard. It’s really hard to see these civil service organizations try to
upskill that quickly. And it would really help them and help everybody and
help the summit series if there were something like, for instance, a
secretariat that was in existence that could help everybody, from summit to
summit, that would provide continuity. Or if there were working groups that could
do something similar, could continue the work of the previous summit, leading
up to the next summit. If there was a troika system, like, for instance, they
have at the G20, where the previous host, the current host, and the host that
will be after the current hosts, those three countries get together and form
a troika, and actually work together to provide continuity. That’s common in
some other international processes. That’s exactly the kind of thing that we’d
like to see here. And we’d like to see some institutionalization of the
different tracks that could exist from summit to summit. I think it’s like there’s a fight over what
the summit should focus on. And I think many of us would rather see just
different tracks that happened at each summit, so that there wouldn’t need to
be a fight about, okay, should we have this thing or that thing? No. You just
have one track for that thing. The people that want to work on that are over
there on that track, and the countries that want to focus on that track are
over there, and then another track for the folks that want to focus on a
different set of issues. So, greater institutionalization, we think, would be
a key thing. And right now, we know that the next host after India’s upcoming
summit in February of the next year, we know that the hosts after that will
be Switzerland. We have a little bit of idea about what India will focus on
now. We have no idea what Switzerland will focus
on. And we have no idea who will be after that. So, it’s hard to create
really momentum without some foreknowledge about what will happen. Mark Leon Goldberg: Then, as you described earlier, progress
happens when there is that kind of momentum where you’re building on what
happened in the previous meeting. I think you use like incremental progress
is a good outcome for a series like this and for a series of meetings like
this. You also note in that paper you reference from the Oxford Martin School
that, broadly speaking, instead of like a proliferation of things that these
summits ought to be focused on, you advocate for two broad thematic focuses.
The governance of advanced AI, on the one side, and then also opportunities
for leveraging AI for the public interest on the other side. Could you just
unpack that a little bit? Robert Trager: I mean, right now, there’s a huge number of
countries around the world that are really trying to figure out how should
they interact with this technology that seems to be changing the world. And
they don’t know, for instance, how should they develop tests to see if AI
that maybe is being used in their country is the sort of AI that they want to
be used. Does it follow the law fundamentally within their country? They’re
not sure. Do we need to develop our own test to do that? Should we be
coordinating with others, then test what they have? But maybe they don’t know
what we would want and what our law mandates. So, countries are trying to
figure out how they should interact with this new technology that’s having
such an impact. And that’s a kind of thing, as well as
thinking about broadening access to the technology, that we thought the
public interest group could focus on. The access to the technology, of
course, is very uneven at the moment. The development of the technology is
very uneven. And, again, lots of people around the world are asking, “Well,
how can we participate?” So, thinking through some of those problems and
thinking through broad-based voice and access is something that we thought a
lot of people wanted to focus on at the French summit. And we think that’s
good. They should be focused on that. And that’s what the public interest
track could focus on. And then you have a governance track that is
addressing maybe some of the potential risks. And those are a variety of
different things and is more carrying on the mandate from Bletchley. So,
that’s sort of how we thought about it. I don’t think that’s the only way
that you could do it, but it’s something we thought would be productive. Mark Leon Goldberg: I suppose the value that I see in that
approach, as you described it, is, again, having covered these kinds of
summit and these kinds of global governance efforts in the past, like the key
fault lines in these situations, tend to be between the global north and the
global south. And by creating that dual track system, by prioritizing public
interest opportunities as much as the governance of AI, which is the
provenance of wealthier countries and the companies in the global north, you
seem to attempt to bridge that gap. Robert Trager: I think you’re right. We see that in the
climate negotiations. We see that all over the place. And I think there are
reasons why there are these tensions. There tend to be a small set of
countries that have interests that are different from this broad, larger set
of countries. And sometimes that can be hard to bridge. But I hope that
you’re right, that this two-track system is a way that, at least in the sense
of discussing and finding solutions, that can be bridged. Mark Leon Goldberg: So, there are a number of existing attempts
on platforms and forums around AI governance. How might an empowered AI
summit series, as you describe it, interact with those other platforms and
forums? Robert Trager: I do think that it has to adapt as other
initiatives gain steam. It’ll have to adapt. I think it would have been
potentially a very productive approach if there had been kind of a norm that,
okay, the companies are going to get together and they’re going to make
incremental progress, as you were saying before. And so, all that was, okay,
you’re going to develop a frontier safety framework. The companies were
committing to do that. That’s one of the commitments. They also thought that
they would be presenting their frontier safety frameworks at the French
summit, and that really didn’t end up happening. I think that was a surprise
to the companies that they weren’t asked to do that. But that’s the kind of thing — Let’s make
some commitments based on the needs of the day. Let’s have that discussion.
Let’s present the ways that companies are thinking about it. And we can have
a kind of global discussion with them, and incentives globally to converge
towards what, hopefully, one day will be a set of global standards. Mark Leon Goldberg: On that last point — hopefully, one day
there might be a set of global standards — what are the stakes involved in
getting this right or getting it wrong, or letting this series languish
without the reforms that might make it more impactful? Robert Trager: Well, we don’t know the future course of the
technology, and it’s hard to say on what timeline different capabilities will
emerge. But right now, we are poised to deploy AI agents globally that will
have ever more sophisticated world models, will have their own sets of
preferences, and maybe, in the near future, will have capabilities that
exceed our own. And we don’t know if that’s true. When it happens, it will be
a revolution in world affairs. So, that’s something that we have to deal
with. Now, these agents are having impacts that cross borders. They can use
the tools of the digital world to have an impact far beyond where they are
created and hosted. And so, we might like them, for instance, to follow the
rules and the laws of the place where they are having that impact. But in order to do that, we probably need to
engage with the data centers that are hosting the agents. But those data
centers may be across borders and half a world away. So, fundamentally, we
don’t know exactly what the stakes are, but it’s now reasonable to think that
the stakes could be quite high, and maybe extremely high. Mark Leon Goldberg: So, in the coming weeks or months or even
years, what will you be looking towards that will suggest to you whether or
not some of these meaningful reforms to the AI summit series, or AI
governance in general, are actually coming to fruition? Robert Trager: I think we’re going to have to look to see
if these actors, like companies, like governments, are implementing policies
that are in societal interests. And that’s the fundamental thing that we’re
going to have to be looking out for. I think the summit series is one place
where things can happen. It’s played an important role in the past, and,
therefore, I’m of the view about many things that if it isn’t broken, then
maybe keep using it until it’s not working. So, things about the summit series that we
look for are continuity. Are we actually seeing that they’re making
incremental progress each time, that they are making the needed progress each
time in order to have the appropriate sets of norms, best practices, in some
cases regulations, to lead to flourishing societies? Mark Leon Goldberg: Robert, thank you so much for your time.
This was really helpful. Robert Trager: Thanks so much. Mark Leon Goldberg: Thanks for listening to Global Dispatches.
The show is produced by me, Mark Leon Goldberg. It is edited and mixed by
Levi Sharpe. If you are listening on Apple Podcasts, make sure to follow the
show and enable automatic downloads to get new episodes as soon as they’re
released. On Spotify, tap the bell icon to get a notification when we publish
new episodes. And, of course, please visit globaldispatches.org to get on our free mailing list, get
in touch with me, and access our full archive. Thank you! |
No, You Aren’t Hallucinating, the Corporate Plan for AI Is
Dangerous
Martin Hart-Landsberg. Mronline.org (6-28-25).
Big tech is working hard to
sell us on artificial intelligence, in particular what is called “artificial
general intelligence.” At conferences and in interviews corporate leaders
describe a not-too-distant future when AI systems will be able to do everything
for everyone, producing a world of plenty for all. But they warn, that future
depends on […]
The rule of the oligarchs and machines is here
Editor. mronline.org (1-10-25).
2025 is set to be the
‘break-out year’ for artificial intelligence.
Robert
Weissman. “AUTOMATION, ROBOTICS, AI
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE massive possibility for fraud.”
Public Citizen via uark.onmicrosoft.com 5-7-24
“Policymakers must
rush to put in place protections or we’re facing electoral chaos.”
That’s what I told The New York Times in a story on deceptive
content generated by artificial intelligence (AI) technology — audio, imagery,
and video known as “deepfakes” — being used to mislead voters and foment
confusion around elections.
And here’s what I said on NBC Nightly News:
“They are compelling and convincing. They sound real. They look real. So
there’s massive possibility for fraud.”
AI-generated deepfakes threaten democracy as we know it:
· With Big Tech recklessly pumping out ever more
powerful AI, we are rapidly getting to the point where everyday Americans, and
even experts, won’t be able to distinguish what’s real from what’s fake.
· Without clear rules in place in time,
AI-generated deepfakes could very well determine the outcome of the 2024
presidential election.
· Equally as threatening to a functioning
society, an onslaught of deepfakes could make voters feel so confused and
powerless that millions essentially give up on our democracy altogether.
With Public Citizen
leading the way, 15 states have already passed legislation — with bipartisan
support — to minimize the chances of deepfakes undermining statewide elections.
And we formally petitioned the Federal Election Commission (FEC) — the
government agency that is *supposed* to safeguard the fairness and integrity of
our elections — to issue clear rules banning the use of deepfakes by national
candidates and political parties.
But the FEC is dragging its feet, so rules may not be in place in time to
prevent AI-generated deepfakes from wreaking havoc throughout the upcoming
presidential election.
To the Federal Election Commission:
Why is the Federal Election Commission STILL
dragging its feet on the threat that political deepfakes pose to the very core
of our democracy? The FEC must act without further delay — before it is too
late for the 2024 election — and issue clear rules banning the use of
AI-generated deepfakes by federal candidates and parties.
Click to add your name now.
Thanks for taking action.
For democracy,
- Robert Weissman, President of Public Citizen
Public Citizen | 1600 20th Street NW | Washington DC 20009
| Unsubscribe
“The Eye of the Master: A Social History of Artificial
Intelligence” – book review
Editor. mronline.org (1-21-24).
Pasquinelli’s "Eye of
the Master" provides a materialist analysis of AI and technology, which
Kevin Crane finds to be an excellent antidote to all the nonsense and hype
spouted about AI.
Op Ed
Today July 24
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Sections
OPINION | CORALIE KOONCE: Monster
on loose?
Moving too fast on new technology by Coralie Koonce Special to the Democrat-Gazette
| July 24, 2023
Some decades ago,
I read that the salvation of capitalism lay in genetic engineering and digital
technology. We have seen this prediction play out with many innovations and
huge new markets.
By 2020, bio-tech
accounted for about 2 million jobs (1 percent of all jobs) and a $2.9 trillion
impact on the economy (14 percent of gross domestic product). That includes
biomedical research, bioengineered seeds, GMO foods, and more.
Similarly, the
digital economy was 10.2 percent, or $2.1 trillion, of U.S. GDP, with growth
led by an expansion of e-commerce. Together, bio-tech and digital technology
add up to almost one-fourth of economic activity.
Ordinary people
gained. I love my word processor! But technologies also have unintended
consequences. Introducing new genetic material into nature resulted in new
resistant pathogens. Artificial intelligence contains its programmers'
prejudices. A large nuclear electricity plant like Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine can
be turned into a ticking bomb.
There's no
referendum asking the public whether we want a new technology to dominate our
lives. No agency to show everybody how to use it. Yet everybody is expected to
have a smartphone, even a homeless person living under a bridge. Our only role
is as individual consumers.
Meanwhile,
science fiction serves as our early warning system. Mary Shelley wrote the
first science fiction story in 1818, in which Victor Frankenstein, "the
new Prometheus," creates a living man from body parts. This does not turn
out well.
E.M. Forster's
prescient short story about the future, "The Machine Stops" (1909),
shows a society completely dependent on an automated network. When it suddenly
stops, people have no idea how to keep themselves alive.
Czech playwright
Karel Capek introduced the term robot in a 1920 play. "Rossum's Universal
Robots"--produced in a factory--end up causing the extinction of the human
race. However, Isaac Asimov's 1950 novel "I, Robot" gave us the three
laws of robotics, designed to keep robots our devoted servants.
By now there are
dozens of science-fiction novels about artificial intelligence (AI), not to
mention many popular movies from "A Space Odyssey" to "The
Matrix."
Lately, however,
warnings have been coming thick and fast from quite a different direction--the
very people who developed artificial intelligence in the first place.
Surprisingly, industry leaders want more regulation of their own industry.
Hundreds of executives, researchers, and engineers recently signed a statement
saying: "Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global
priority alongside other societal-scale risks, such as pandemics and nuclear
war."
Risk of
extinction they say. Yet they had to know this day was coming.
Another open
letter, signed by over 1,000 people in this field, called for a six-month pause
in development. They spoke of "an out-of-control race to develop and
deploy ever more powerful digital minds."
The sudden
concern was prompted by a new generation of Chatbots such as ChatGPT, Bing, and
Bard, which can conduct open-ended conversations, write poetry, or generate
code. Immediate fears are that advanced AI will be used to spread
misinformation and propaganda. It could also eliminate millions of white-collar
jobs, according to a May story by Kevin Roose in The New York Times.
AI's rapid
improvement means that Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) may soon match or
exceed human performance in several areas. Chatbots have "emergent
properties" and are teaching themselves to do new things.
The Technological
Singularity, a hypothetical future time when superintelligence replaces mere
human intelligence, was first described by mathematician Vernor Vinge in 1993.
Ray Kurzweil, a prominent proponent, believes it will usher in a wonderful era
("The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology," 2005).
Such
techno-utopians believe advanced technology will end the problem of economic
scarcity and bring out the best in people. However, they don't have much to say
about human psychology, the natural environment, or those living in the poorer
85 percent of the world.
Obviously, many
in this field are frightened by the speed of new developments, although quite
divided about exactly what is happening and what should happen next. Perhaps an
international AI safety organization, similar to the International Atomic
Energy Agency?
In 2021, UNESCO
made recommendations for ethical guardrails, pointing out that AI business
models are concentrated in just a few countries, a handful of firms, and
male-dominated teams. Meanwhile, half the world doesn't have an Internet
connection.
On a recent
episode of "60 Minutes" (July 9), an industry person said societies
must quickly adapt. But why must we always be the ones to adapt to the
technology? Technologies are not fated. Billions of dollars are poured into
them, and thousands of bright people employed to develop them.
We need a great
deal more information about AI issues and choices, including philosophical
questions and ethical dilemmas.
For at least 80
years, humans have been developing and deploying risky new technologies because
they had economic potential. It is time that ordinary people had a say in these
decisions.
Coralie Koonce is
a writer living in Fayetteville, and the author of "Little Handbook of
Arguments."
|
END AI and CAPITALISM ANTHOLOGY #1
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