OMNI
UKRAINE WAR ANTHOLOGY #37
6-6-26
COMPILED BY DICK BENNETT
FOR A CULTURE OF PEACE, JUSTICE, ECOLOGY, AND DEMOCRACY
What’s
at Stake Issues: Causes of the War, Russia Provoked, Follies of Empire, Peace Plan, Tomahawk
Missiles, UK’s Role, etc.!
CONTENTS
Aaron Mate. “How NATO provoked Russia in Ukraine.”
Richard Sakwa. (new book) The
Russo-Ukrainian War: Follies of Empire.
Chris
Hedges. “The 28-Point Ukraine Peace
Plan (w/ George Galloway).”
Benjamin
and Davies. (book) War in Ukraine
(rev. 2nd ed.).
Nicolai Petro and Ted Snider. “The Root Causes of the War in Ukraine.”
M.K. Bhadradumar. “Intrigue — and
Confusion —Reign Over Ukraine.”
Scott Ritter. Denounces Tomahawk
Missiles to Ukraine.
Scott Ritter. “The
Death of a Nation” [Ukraine].
Big
Serge. The War as of March 2025.
Big Serge. The War as of August 2025.
Lord Robert Skidelsky. UK’s Ukrainian
Policy.
TEXTS
Who,
What, When, Why started the War Arguments are scattered throughout these
publications.
“VIDEO: Aaron Mate: How NATO provoked Russia in Ukraine and prevented
peace.” ACURA (Mar 28, 2025).
Mate argues that the US and NATO provoked Russia in Ukraine by expanding NATO,
dismantling arms control, installing military assets threatening Russia,
meddling in Ukraine, and blocking multiple opportunities for peace. Read in browser »
I
have just now read this citation and the Preface to Sakwa’s new book. In order to share the book’s apparently extraordinary
comprehensiveness immediately, I will publish this note here and plan to expand
it in Ukraine War Anthology #38.
The TRR Podcast. “Richard
Sakwa on the War in Ukraine and the Follies of Empire.” ACURA (Apr 19, 2026).
This week, TRR had the pleasure of speaking with the eminent scholar of Russia,
Richard Sakwa, emeritus professor of politics at the University of Kent in the
UK. His new book (his fifth since 2020) is called The Russo-Ukrainian
War: Follies of Empire, which examines the root causes of the current
conflict.
Read in browser »
[I cannot copy/paste the
Preface, but I was able to copy a page at a time, so here is a key paragraph. –D]
So why, then, did the
protagonists stumble into conflict? I provided the larger analysis in Russia Against the Rest (2017),10 complemented by my study of the
broader failure to achieve a positive peace after the end of the Cold War in
1989–1991 in The Lost Peace
(2023).11 My interpretive historical analysis is developed in this book. I
outline the four entwined levels of the conflict: struggles over models of
state and nation building within Ukraine that generated intense elite
contestation; tensions in relations between Russia and Ukraine; the failure to
establish an equitable and inclusive post–Cold War pancontinental European
security order; and the stresses induced by great power contradictions in
Russo–US relations. Overarching them all is the larger question of the
character of the international system established in 1945 and the changes
wrought in the balance of power by the end of the Cold War. After 1945 a
Political West took shape, in which the United States’ preeminent power was
embedded in the form of a military-ideological alliance system, which also
changed the character of the US polity itself as the
military-industrial-ideological complex consolidated its power and influence.
“Chris Hedges on the 28-Point Ukraine Peace Plan (w/ George
Galloway).” The Chris
Hedges Report (November 20, 2025).
Something
is happening here, what it is isn't exactly clear. Chris Hedges on the
so-called 28-point Ukraine peace plan. And don't ignore the flashing red
lights. Chris Hedges.
MEDEA BENJAMIN and NICOLAS J.S. DAVIES. War in Ukraine : Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict
(Rev. 2nd ed.).
Preface by KATRINA VANDEN HEUVEL.
Brings the story of the Ukraine war up to 2025, as Trump’s
return sparks a push for negotiations. For those seeking to cut through media
propaganda and grasp the stakes of a potentially cataclysmic conflict, this is
essential reading.
“This careful,
informed, judicious study is an invaluable guide to understanding Russia’s
criminal invasion of Ukraine, and most crucially, how we can act to help bring
this terrible tragedy to an end.”
— Noam Chomsky “This book is an important antidote to
the war propaganda about Ukraine that so many in the West are caught up in.”
— Mairead Maguire, activist and winner of the Nobel Peace
Prize
“Give this book to
anyone seeking the knowledge and wisdom needed to help end the violence in
Ukraine.”
— David Swanson, executive director of World Beyond War
“This concise
primer gives what U.S. media consumers so rarely get—historical context with
balance and compassion.”
— Norman Solomon, executive director of the Institute for
Public Accuracy
“Should be
mandatory reading in all strategic and political studies courses in
universities around the world.”
— Jonathan Ferraby, Head of Mission Support for the OSCE
SMMU, 2014–2015
Now extensively revised
and updated, here is a concise, accessible, and highly informative primer on a
conflict that persists in roiling the global balance of power.
Publisher’s
description: This expanded new
edition of a widely praised book brings the story of the war in Ukraine up to
2025, as Donald Trump’s return to office sparked a renewed push for
negotiations. Trump’s 2024 campaign hinged on the claim that the war would
never have started under his watch—topped by a promise to end it in twenty-four
hours. His new defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, signaled a shift from Biden-era
policy, calling a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders unrealistic
and telling NATO, “The bloodshed must stop. And this war must end.” The authors
ask: have we reached a true turning point—or just more great-power posturing?
Skillfully bringing
together the historical record and current analysis, Benjamin and Davies look
at the events leading up to the conflict, survey the different parties
involved, and weigh up the continuing risks of escalation and opportunities for
peace. For anyone who wants to get beneath the heavily propagandized media
coverage to an understanding of a war with consequences that could prove
cataclysmic, reading this book will be an urgent necessity.
The
Chris Hedges Report is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and
support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Thanks for
reading The Chris Hedges Report! This post is public so feel free to share it. Share
Nicolai Petro
and Ted Snider. “The Root Causes of the
War in Ukraine.” ACURA (Nov 05, 2025).
There has been a great deal of confusion about why it is so
difficult to achieve a ceasefire, and why Russia insists on a comprehensive
peace settlement that deals with “the root causes” of the crisis. Read in browser »
M.K. Bhadradumar. “Intrigue —
and Confusion —
Reign Over Ukraine.” Consortium News
(10-6-25).
U.S. President Donald Trump aired frustrations that his efforts to end
the Ukraine war are not working with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The
matrix is getting complicated, writes M.K. Bhadradumar. Read here...
“Ritter's Rant 057: Insanity.”
September 29, 2025.
Keith
Kellogg says the US might provide Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles. My
response: Insanity. Scott Ritter
“The Death of a Nation” by Real Scott Ritter.
September 23, 2025.
President Trump
announced that he supports Ukraine’s goals of returning to their 1991 borders
with Russia. He believes he is helping Ukraine. All he has done is insure the
destruction of a nation. Scott Ritter
“Trump addresses the UN on September
23, 2025.”
With one stunning social
media post, President Donald Trump ended all pretense at being a broker
of peace between Russia and Ukraine. During his campaign in the 2024
Presidential election, Trump repeatedly emphasized that his goal was to bring
the conflict to an end “within 24 hours” of being sworn in. While this
timeframe proved elusive, Trump remained committed to achieving a lasting
peace, even if he was unable to articulate a strategy on how exactly this would
be accomplished.
Trump has, from the very
onset of his presidency, been ill advised by a coterie of foreign and national
security officials who, with very few exceptions, are dyed in the wool Russophobes.
From his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to his National Security Advisor
(initially Mike Waltz and, after his firing in May, Marco Rubio, wearing two
hats ala Henry Kissinger), to his Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, to his
CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, and on to his Secretary of the Treasury, Scott
Bessant, Trump has surrounded himself with people who have spent their adult
lives loathing Russia and its leadership.
To the extent that Trump
has access to advisors who might advocate good relations with Russia, he either
dismisses their advice (as is the case with Tulsi Gabbard, his Director of
National Intelligence), or nullifies their advice by having a Russophobic counter
(as is the case with his Russia Special Envoy, Steve Witkoff, whose insights
are offset by the anti-Russian positions held by Keith Kellogg.)
Trump’s base instincts,
which incline towards not only ending the conflict in Ukraine but also
normalizing relations with Russia, are subjected to considerable pushback from
his inner circle, with little or no pushback coming from any other source.
Making matters worse is the fact that America’s European allies are almost
unanimously supportive of policies designed to keep Ukraine in a fight designed
to strategically defeat Russia. As a result, what passes for Russia policy in
the Trump administration suffers from severe vaccination [vacillation? -D] as
Trump is subjected to pressure from all sides to turn his back on Russia and
its leader, President Vladimir Putin.
In August, it looked
like the President’s instincts had won out, with Trump meeting with Putin in
Alaska. This meeting resulted in Trump largely embracing Russia’s positions of
conflict termination which would require Ukraine to agree to territorial concessions
as well as limitations on its military size and political sovereignty.
Barely a month later,
President Trump appears to have done a complete 180 degree turn regarding the
issue of territorial concessions. “After getting to know and fully understand
the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation,” Trump posted on his Truth
Social account, “and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I
think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to
fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form. With time, patience,
and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original
Borders from where this War started, is very much an option.”
Trump then changed
direction regarding his prognosis of how the conflict was progressing. Back in
May, Trump acknowledged that Russian President Putin was not looking for an
off-ramp from the conflict in Ukraine because Russia believed it was winning
the war. This perception was held through the Alaska Summit. But Ukrainian
claims of a successful counterattack north of Pokrovsk, and continued Ukrainian
drone strikes against Russian energy targets, helped sway Trump into changing
his analysis. “Russia,” Trump noted, “has been fighting aimlessly for three and
a half years a War that should have taken a Real Military Power less than a
week to win. This is not distinguishing Russia. In fact, it is very much making
them look like ‘a paper tiger.’”
Trump then went on to
further characterize his perception of a weakened Russia now vulnerable to an
emboldened Ukraine. “When the people living in Moscow, and all of the Great
Cities, Towns, and Districts all throughout Russia, find out what is really going
on with this War,” Trump wrote, “the fact that it’s almost impossible for them
to get Gasoline through the long lines that are being formed, and all of the
other things that are taking place in their War Economy, where most of their
money is being spent on fighting Ukraine, which has Great Spirit, and only
getting better, Ukraine would be able to take back their Country in its
original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that!”
Ignore for the moment
that Trump literally greenlighted actions which, if implemented, would most
certainly result in a nuclear war. The fact is someone has convinced Trump that
Russia is vulnerable militarily and economically. “Putin and Russia are in BIG
Economic trouble,” Trump declared, “and this is the time for Ukraine to act.”
Trump closed by “wishing
both countries well” and stating that the US “will continue to supply weapons
to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them.”
This post by Trump puts
to rest any notion that he remains committed to solving the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict. . . .No one should have been surprised by this move—Trump has been
stating that he would walk away from the conflict if he were unable to get both
parties interested in concluding a peace deal. Neither were, and this is the
result.
On the surface Trump’s
posting comes off as anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. But the public posturing
hides the simple truth that Trump is largely abandoning Ukraine to its
inevitable destiny with fate. While Trump has embraced Zelensky’s narrative
regarding Ukraine’s battlefield prowess and Russia’s economic weakness, he has
taken no meaningful action to further either to Ukraine’s advantage.
Trump will not be
altering his administration’s policies regarding arms sales to Ukraine,
continuing instead to follow a formula which has Europe purchasing weapons from
the United States and then transferring them to Ukraine. There is no change in
the prioritization of manufacture, which is skewed in favor of replenishing
depleted US stockpiles. The result is that the weapons Ukraine claims it so
desperately needs will not begin flowing into Ukraine in any meaningful
quantities until 2027.
Trump likewise has
linked any decisive US move regarding the sanctioning of Russia to similar
moves on the part of Europe, including the cessation of all purchases of
Russian oil and gas and the imposition of sanctions on India and China as
punishment for their continued purchasing of Russian energy. The problem is
Europe is unable to meet these prerequisites, meaning that the US policy when
it comes to the sanctioning of Russia will remain largely unchanged.
The reality is that
Trump’s highly charged rhetoric aside, there is no fundamental change in the US
approach toward Russia and the Ukraine conflict. And just because Trump claims
Ukrainian military superiority over Russia, and Russian economic weakness, does
not make either so.
Russia continues to
maintain a strategic advantage over Ukraine across every metric used to measure
success in conflict—militarily, economically, and politically.
Worse, Trump’s words
make achieving a negotiated settlement all but impossible. As a result, Europe
will continue to provide financial and military support to Ukraine, prolonging
a conflict which has been lost for some time now.
But this prolongation
will be to the detriment of Ukraine. Russia has mastered the algorithm of
attritional warfare, and Ukraine will continue to lose manpower and equipment
at a rate that far exceeds its ability to replace either. Russia will likewise
continue to destroy critical industrial and energy infrastructure, making
Ukraine even more dependent upon European largesse for its continued survival.
The combination of military and economic stresses will in turn place strain on
the continued political viability of the Zelensky government. Eventually the
combined stress of these three collapsing pillars will lead to the
disintegration of Ukraine as a governable territory.
In short, Ukraine will
no longer exist as a sovereign country.
The price of this defeat
will be unbearable for Ukraine. One can easily anticipate death tolls among
Ukrainian soldiers that double the 1.7 million dead and missing Ukrainian
soldiers who have fallen to date. Ukraine will lose additional territories as well,
including Odessa, Mikolayev, Kharkov, and perhaps Dnepropetrovsk and Sumy as
well. One can anticipate, too, the further loss of territories as Poland,
Hungary, and Romania carve up what remains, leaving only a small rump state
centered on Kiev that would be known as Ukraine. The concept of independence
and sovereignty has likewise been mooted—whatever remains of Ukraine will
forever be under the control of Russia. Dreams of European Union membership
will be replaced by Ukraine’s status as the junior partner of an expanded Union
State.
This is what Donald
Trump has accomplished through his social media posting and subsequent media
appearances. He thinks he is posturing as a strong man. But the reality is far
different: Donald Trump, by lifting the hopes of Ukraine while simultaneously dashing
them, has exposed himself as being intellectually limited and morally
diminished. Only too late will Ukraine and its European allies realize they
have been duped. By then, the duplicity of Donald Trump will be evident to
all—except of course the millions of Ukrainians who will perish as a result. Donate
FOR COMBAT AFFICIONADOS, BIG SERGE here PROVIDES two more
chapters apparently of a forthcoming book examining combat operations,
strategies, predicting outcomes, UP-CLOSE DETAILS INCLUDING CALIBRATED MAPS
(plus analysis of leaders).
A Review of the War by a Big Scholar Writing a Big Book.
Big Serge. “Ukraine: Fighting to the Conclusion:
Russo-Ukrainian
War, Spring 2025.” Mar 28, 2025.
[I could not find a
bio of the author via google. –D]
The Russo-Ukrainian War
is now three years old, and the third Z-Day, on February 24, 2025, was marked
by a substantively different tone than prior iterations. On the battlefield,
Russian forces stand significantly closer to victory than they have at any point
since the opening weeks of the war. After reversals early in the war as Ukraine
took advantage of Russian miscalculations and insufficient force generation,
the Russian army surged in 2024, collapsing Ukraine’s front in southern Donetsk
and pushing the front forward towards the remaining citadels of the Donbas.
At the same time, 2025’s
Z-Day was the first under the new American administration, and hopes were high
in some quarters that President Trump could bring about a negotiated settlement
and end the war prematurely. The new tenor seemed to be made abundantly clear
in an explosive February 28 Oval Office meeting between Trump, Vice President
Vance, and Zelensky, which ended in the Ukrainian president being ignominiously
shouted down and evicted from the White House. This followed an abrupt
announcement that Ukraine was to be cut off from American ISR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) until Zelensky apologized for his conduct.
In an information sphere
rife with rumors, inscrutable diplomatic maneuvering, and heavy handed
posturing (clouded further by the distinctive style and personality of Trump
himself), it is very hard to figure out what might actually matter. We’re left
with a bizarre juxtaposition: based on the explosive vignettes of Trump and
Zelensky, many might hope for an abrupt course change on the war, or at least a
revision of the American position. On the ground, however, things continue much
as they have, with the Russians grinding forward along a sprawling front. The
infantryman entrenched near Pokrovsk, listening for the whirring of drones
overhead, could be forgiven for not feeling that much has changed at all.
I have never made any
bones about my belief that the war in Ukraine will be resolved militarily: that
is, it will be fought to its conclusion and end in the defeat of Ukraine in the
east, Russian control of vast swathes of the country, and the subordination of
a rump Ukraine to Russian interests. Trump’s self conception is greatly tied up
in his image as a “dealmaker”, and his view of foreign affairs as fundamentally
transactional in nature. As the American president, he has the power to force
this framing on Ukraine, but not on Russia. There remain intractable gulfs
between Russia’s war aims and what Kiev is willing to discuss, and it is
doubtful that Trump will be able to reconcile these differences. Russia,
however, does not need to accept a partial victory simply in the name of
goodwill and negotiation. Moscow has recourse to a more primal form of power.
The sword predates and transcends the pen. Negotiation, as such, must bow to
the reality of the battlefield, and no amount of sharp deal making can
transcend the more ancient law of blood.
The
Great Misadventure: Front Collapse in Kursk. . . .
A
Brief Tour of the Front
The Kursk salient is the
second front to be fully collapsed by the Russian Army in the past three
months. The first was the southern Donetsk front, which was completely caved in
over the course of December and then rolled up in the opening weeks of the year,
which had the effect of not only knocking the AFU out of longstanding
strongholds like Ugledar and Kurakhove, but also safeguarding the flank of the
Russian advance towards Pokrovsk.
At the moment, there are
several axes of Russian progress which we’ll examine in more detail
momentarily. More broadly, as Russia scratches off secondary axes like South
Donetsk and Kursk, the general trajectory of the front is becoming more
focused, as the arrows converge on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. Eyes
on the prize. Russia currently controls roughly 99% of Lugansk Oblast and 70%
of Donetsk.
The Donbas: March Situation
We’ll take a brief tour
of these axes of combat. One of the motifs which will immediately stand out is
that in multiple critical sectors, Russian forces currently occupy
operationally potent positions that give them powerful launchpads for further
advances in 2025. In particular, the Russians currently hold multiple
bridgeheads across river lines, putting them in position to outflank Ukrainian
defensive lines, and they have consolidated control of dominating heights in
places like Chasiv Yar.
We can begin at the
northernmost end of the line, at Kupyansk. Kupyansk is a modestly sized town
(prewar population of perhaps 26,000 people) located at a strategic crossroads
on the Oskil River, which is the largest tributary of the Donets. More specifically,
Kupyansk is at the intersection of the main east-west highway out of Kharkov
and the Oskil highway corridor which runs south to Izym, and it is also the
most important transit hub for crossing the Oskil in its northern course. The
city was captured early in the war by Russian forces and served as an important
plug to prevent the movement of Ukrainian reserves into northern Lugansk
Oblast, and was later recaptured during Ukraine’s late-2022 counteroffensive,
which saw them push the front away from Kharkov and across the Oskil.
Today, Kupyansk serves
as the vital transit hub, base of support, and crossing point that supports a
Ukrainian grouping fighting on the east bank of the Oskil. As the battlefield
is currently shaped here, however, Russian forces have a tantalizing
opportunity to collapse the Ukrainian position altogether. The critical feature
here is the consolidation of a sizeable Russian bridgehead north of Kupyansk on
the west bank of the Oskil (that is, the Ukrainian side), with
Russian forces already positioned on the north-south highway. Although this
northern front has been a decidedly de-prioritized theater in recent months, as
the Russians scratched off the Kursk and South Donetsk fronts, the placement of
Russian forces west of the Oskil creates serious problems for the AFU in
Kupyansk.
An advance to the south
and west out of the Oskil bridgehead would flank Kupyansk and, in combination
with advances from the southeast, threaten to collapse Ukraine’s salient across
the Oskil altogether. Depending on how much combat power Russia commits to this
axis, we could see a similar situation to the one we saw in Kursk, with multiple
brigades (currently fighting east of the Oskil) forced to attempt an ad-hoc
evacuation across the river as the salient collapses, with their ability to
extract heavy equipment potentially compromised by the complication of the
river crossing.
Further south on this
front, we see a similar situation on the Donets axis. The operational geography
here is a bit complicated, so we will indulge in a bit of an elaboration.
The northern Donetsk
theater (with its ultimate prize in the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration) is
dominated by two important terrain features. The first is the fact that the
urban corridor (which runs from Kostyantynivka northward to Slovyansk) lies at
low elevation along the course of the Kryvyi Torets River - while the river
itself is not an important feature, the low elevation of its basin is. This
means that the cities themselves are dominated by heights to the east, with
Chasiv Yar forming an important hub and stronghold at a commanding elevation.
Northern Donetsk Elevation Map
The second important
terrain feature is the Donets River - unlike the diminutive Kryvyi Torets, this
is an imposing barrier which bisects the Donbas and forms the northern shield
for Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Russian control of the Donets from the north bank
(either at Lyman or, ideally, Izyum further to the west) unlocks the potential
to outflank Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the west and interdict road traffic.
In short, although
Kramatorsk and Slovyansk together form an imposing urban agglomeration, their
defense is intimately connected with the battle for both the heights to the
east and the struggle for control of the Donets. At the current moment,
however, Russian forces hold valuable positions which provide a launching pad
to unlock this front.
When we zoom in more
closely, we see that the Ukrainian defenses around the Donets have benefited
from the terrain. On the north bank of the Donets, Russian forces must also
contend with an ancillary waterway in the Zherebets River, which flows south
towards the Donets and feeds several reservoirs which form formidable defense
barriers. The gap between the Zherebets and the Donets is roughly five miles,
forming a natural defensive bottleneck, and most of that gap is covered by the
town of Tors’ke (now heavily fortified) and a dense plantation forest. For most
of the past eighteen months, this section of front has been largely static,
with Russian forces failing to make significant headway fighting into this
bottleneck.
One way for Russia to
undermine this strong defensive position might have been to advance along
the south bank of the Donets, reaching the crossing near
Yampil and outflanking the Tors’ke line from the southeast. This would have
isolated the Ukrainian forces fighting in the forestry plantation and allowed
the Russians to advance through the bottleneck. Ultimately, this did not
materialize due to the low material priority placed on this front in addition
to a very well-managed defense of the Siversk salient by Ukrainian forces.
Siversk has been strongly held, and serves as the shield for the Ukrainian
right flank.
What is different now,
however, is that Russian forces have consolidated a bridgehead over the
Zherebets River, which will allow them to outflank Tors’ke and reach Lyman -
not from the south, but from the north. Recent weeks have seen the Russians
moving into the small villages around the periphery of their bridgehead (names
like Kolodyazi and Myrne), creating the space to move additional units over the
Zherebets. Much like at Kupyansk, the bridgehead offers the launching point for
a sweeping hook into the rear of the Ukrainian defenses.
Northern Donbas: General Situation
What stands out about
the Russian bridgehead here is that it is not only over the Zherebets (that is,
Russian forces are firmly on the western bank of the river while the Ukrainians
further south are still defending far to the east of it), but that it is also
past most of the Ukrainian field fortifications in the area. Borrowing from
the Military
Summary Map, which conveniently includes fortifications and
earthworks, we can see that there is very little built up in the space between
the Zherebets and Lyman. Russian forces breaking out of this bridgehead are
entering mostly open space, with only a few roadblocks in place. . . .
Central Donetsk Front: Pokrovsk and Toretsk
That is quite a bit to
chew on, and I sometimes question the value of such analysis. For those who
have been dutifully following this war from the beginning, this is all fairly
elementary. For others with less investment in the front, it’s possible that the
status of these settlements is not very interesting and devolves into esoteric
minutia.
Broadly, however, the
arrows are pointing up for Russia in the Donbas for the following reasons:
1.
The collapse of the Southern Donetsk front for Ukraine
secures the flank of Russia’s advances towards Pokrovsk and allows the front to
be pushed far to the west of the city.
2.
Russian bridgeheads over the Zherebets and Oskil rivers
create opportunities to outflank and collapse Ukrainian positions around
Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk.
3.
The capture of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, both of which lie on
elevated ridges, provides the launching point for strong thrusts towards
Kostyantynivka, collapsing multiple Ukrainian salients in the process.
All in all, this
portends continued Russian advances in the next stage of the offensive.
Pokrovsk is already a frontline city, and Kostyantynivka will become one very
soon. The Russians have scratched off two important fronts in the last three
months - collapsing first the South Donetsk axis, and then eradicating the
Ukrainian position in Kursk. The next phase will see breakthroughs in the
Central Donbas, as the Russians move through the next belt of cities and
approach the final objectives in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
None of this is
predetermined, of course. Both armies face continual force allocation problems,
and at the moment large groupings are fighting around both Pokrovsk and Toretsk.
But the simple fact is that the Russians have claimed victory on two strategic
axes and have defeated a large and determined AFU grouping in Kursk. The
captures of Toresk and Chasiv Yar are of great strategic importance, and the
front is well shaped for further Russian gains. Russian forces are
significantly closer to victory in the Donbas than they were a year ago, when
the front was still mired in places like Ugledar and Avdiivka. The Ukrainian
forces are still upright, fighting bravely, but the front is bleeding from an
ever increasing number of wounds.
The
Art of the Deal
Any discussion of the
diplomatic sphere and the prospects for a negotiation peace must begin by
noting the guiding animus of the American stance: namely, that President Trump
is a practitioner of personal politics, with a fundamentally transactional
view of the world. By “personal politics”, we mean that he places great
emphasis on his own interpersonal dynamics and his self-conception as a
dealmaker who can maneuver people into agreement, provided he can just get them
to the table.
Trump is hardly alone in
this; to take one example, we could look at his long-dead predecessor, Franklin
Roosevelt. FDR, much like Trump, took great pride in the idea that he was
exceptionally skilled at managing, soothing, and charming people. A guiding
principle of American policy during the Second World War was FDR’s sense that
he could “manage” Stalin in face to face interactions. In one infamous letter
to Churchill, FDR told the British Prime Minister:
I know you will not mind
my being brutally frank when I tell you that I think I can personally handle
Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin
hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope
he will continue to do so.
Trump shares a similar
sensibility, which postulates personality and transactional acumen as a driving
force of world affairs. To be perfectly fair to President Trump, this has
largely worked for him both in business and domestic politics, but it may not
port over so well to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, this is how he thinks. He
expressed it succinctly in his explosive
February 28th meeting with Zelensky:
Biden, they didn’t
respect him. They didn’t respect Obama. They respect me… He
might have broken deals with Obama and Bush, and he might have broken them with
Biden. He did, maybe. Maybe he did. I don’t know what happened, but he didn’t
break them with me. He wants to make a deal.
Whether or not this is
true, it is an important bedrock in the framing of the situation to remember
that this is how Trump sees himself and the world: politics is a
transactional domain mediated by personalities. With that in mind, there are
two different issues to consider, namely the mineral deal between Ukraine and
the United States, and the prospects for a negotiated ceasefire between Ukraine
and Russia. . . .
The mineral deal is
somewhat easier to parse, and the central motif that emerges is just how badly
Zelensky bungled his meetings with Trump. It’s helpful first to examine the
actual contents of the mineral deal - notwithstanding the enormous $500 billion price
tag, it is actually a very scant agreement. The agreement, as it currently
stands, seems to essentially give American companies the right of first refusal
on the exploitation of Ukrainian mineral resources, with 50% of the proceeds
from state owned resources going to an “investment fund” for the reconstruction
of Ukraine under joint US-Ukrainian management.
The mineral deal ought
to be understood as a manifestation of Trump’s immense aversion to acting at
economic disadvantage. He is a fundamentally transactional man who complained
at great length about the costs of American support for Kiev, and mineral rights
are the easiest way for him to extract promises of “repayment” from a Ukrainian
government that cannot actually afford to repay anything in the near term.
For Ukraine, entangling
America in Ukrainian mineral wealth might seem like an opportunity to ensure
ongoing American support, as it would potentially create direct stakes for
American companies. It’s important to note, however, that the mineral deal does
not contain any security guarantees for Ukraine, and is in fact explicitly tied
to *past* support, rather than future aid. In other words, Trump wants to
present the mineral deal as a way for Ukraine to repay the last three years of
American assistance, and not as a deal guaranteeing American support in the
future.
Given this, it ought to
be obvious that Zelensky badly fumbled his encounter with Trump. The
optimal strategy for Ukraine was to draw as close to the Trump administration
as possible - sign the mineral deal, say thank you, wear a suit, and commend
Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the war. Trump’s negotiations were
guaranteed to run into a wall once the Russians themselves were brought into
the discussion, but in this scenario (one where Zelensky came across as
supportive and compliant towards Trump), Trump’s personal ire would be directed
at Moscow, rather than Kiev. This might have enabled Zelensky to play Trump and
Putin off of each other, parlaying the situation into more American support
once Trump became frustrated at Russia’s unwillingness to quickly negotiate a
ceasefire.
The operating principle
is that Trump is a mercurial, personal politician who places primacy
on the deal. Inability to solidify the deal breeds
irritation, and Zelensky’s best play was to do everything possible to ensure
that it was Russia that became the irritant in Trump’s attempted deal making.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, a valuable opportunity was wasted by Zelensky’s
inability to read the room. Instead, Ukraine was put in an ISR timeout and
Zelensky had to come crawling back with an apology to sign the mineral deal.
This parlayed directly
into tenuous diplomatic feelers, including a long phone conversation between
Trump and Putin and a diplomatic roundtable in Riyadh attended by American,
Russian, and Ukrainian delegations.
Thus far, the only
outcome from these discussions has been the sketch for a climbdown in the Black
Sea, which in its essence would end attacks on commercial shipping (presumably
including Russian attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odessa) in exchange
for American moves to rehabilitate Russian agricultural exports by reconnecting
Russia to shipping insurance, foreign ports, and payment systems.
For those that have been
following along, this is more or less a revival of the defunct
Turkish-negotiated grain deal, which collapsed in 2023. There are still
sticking points here: Ukraine is bristling at the promise to loosen sanctions
on Russian agricultural exports, and Russia will want a robust inspection
regime to ensure that the Black Sea ceasefire does not provide cover for
weapons to be shipped into Odessa, but things appear on the whole to be
returning roughly to the lines of the 2022 grain deal. Whether the rerun will
last remains to be seen.
All of this is
preliminary and perhaps even irrelevant to the main question, which is
whether it is possible to negotiate a meaningful peace in Ukraine at this time,
or even a temporary ceasefire. This, however, is a much larger hurdle to climb.
As I see it, there are four structural obstacles to a negotiated peace which
Trump has little leverage to overcome. . . .
Big Serge. “Scraping the Barrel: Attrition and Cannibalization. Russo-Ukrainian
War: Summer, August 13, 2025.” [Battlefield
historian, Big Serge, analyzes the combat day by days. -D]
Loitering in the ruins
of Pokrovsk
Note: This article will
be relatively short compared to my standard offerings, but I wanted to get some
thoughts on paper as the situation north of Pokrovsk develops. Ukraine is
facing one of the worst operational crises of the war and the situation is liable
to change rapidly. We clearly do not have a perfectly comprehensive picture of
how the front is moving, but I think taking the pulse in real time is still
valuable.
After three years of
war, with the commentariat on both sides eagerly predicting the looming
collapse of the enemy, it behooves one to develop a prudent aversion to
histrionic predictions. However, it seems fairly obvious that the war in
Ukraine is at a critical juncture, and August 2025 will receive considerable
play in retrospective accounts of the conflict, as perhaps the last opportunity
for Ukraine to cut a deal and slither out of its strategic grave.
On Friday, August 15,
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are slated to meet in Alaska to discuss steps
to end the war. Whether those talks will be productive remains to be seen,
although Trump’s acknowledgement that Ukraine will have to cede territory to Russia
signals that the White House is at least drifting towards a realism.
Predictably, the Alaska meetings are being decried by the Europeans and the
Professional Fascism Noticers as a redux of Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement with
Hitler, but this does not really matter. In the same sense that, for the
alcoholic it is always five o’clock somewhere, for a certain type of person it
is always 1938. For these people, World War Two is the only thing that ever
happened, it is always happening, and it is always just about to happen.
Just as a brief aside,
this is one reason why Alaska is actually a meaningful and pointed place
to hold the meetings. The more paranoid sorts believe that there’s some
sinister meaning owing to Alaska’s origins as a Russian colony, but the actual
symbolism of the site lies in the fact that America does not need to
interact with Russia through E urope, and indeed never has. America and
Russia can relate to each other bilaterally, without Brussels or London or Kiev
as an intermediary.
On the ground, the
Alaska meetings coincide with a major rupture of the front. We want to avoid
using overly dramatic verbiage, particularly the much dreaded “collapse” label.
To be clear, it should not be expected that the AFU is on the verge of being routed
completely from the field. Russian forces are not going to roll over the
Dnieper next week or sweep into Kiev or Odessa. Ukraine is not “collapsing”,
but it is losing, and more specifically it is about to suffer a major defeat at
Pokrovsk.
What is happening is not the wholesale
disintegration of the Ukrainian army, but we are clearly at a major inflection
point with two separate dimensions. First and foremost, the front has ruptured
around Pokrovsk (and to a lesser extent around Kupyansk and Lyman), creating
one of the most severe operational crises of the war for the AFU. The second
dimension is more structural and is the cause of the first: Ukraine’s mounting
manpower crisis and its severe shortages of infantry have reached the point where
they can no longer properly defend a continuous frontline. Indeed, it may no
longer be proper to speak of a “front” at all, but rather a sequence of urban
strongpoints with major seams in between them, held together only by the
transient threat of drones striking exploiting Russian elements.
The critical development is relatively easy to
understand. Over the last week or so, Russian forces worked into a seam in the
Ukrainian line north of Pokrovsk and have penetrated deep into the AFU’s rear
areas. Notably, the breach is both deep and wide in the context of this war.
The gap stretches roughly between the villages of Rodynske and Volodymyrivka
and is thus nearly 8 miles wide, and Russian forces have exploited as far as
Dobropillya (some 10 miles to the west) and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (11 miles to the
north). They have thus exploited on two axes and wedged open a sizeable hole in
the Ukrainian front, crossing several unmanned defensive belts which were
designed to be Ukrainian fallback positions, and severing one of the main
highways connecting the southern front to Kramatorsk.
There is quite a lot
that we do not know about the state of the exploitation right now. At this
point, the level of Russian presence in the breach area would seem to vary
substantially. Around Dobropillya, for example, the Russian presence is
currently limited to intermittent DRG teams (essentially reconnaissance and
sabotage units). It is to be expected that the Ukrainians will roll back this
advance to some extent. In many ways, however, the extent of the penetration to
the north is of secondary importance, because the gash in the front has allowed
the noose around Pokrovsk to tighten significantly. In the last 24 hours,
Russian forces moved into Rodynske, cutting yet another arterial highway into
Pokrovsk.
While the attention has
been drawn to the Russian “arrows” fanning out to the northwest, Pokrovsk has
been put into a severe salient, with only the E50 highway still open to
Ukrainian forces. The presence of Russian light infantry teams around
Dobropillya is almost immaterial compared to the firebag around Pokrovsk. We
are almost certainly in the terminal phase of the battle for the city, and the
Russian breakout to the north provides a screen for the net to tighten around
the city. More explicitly, I would argue that the thrust through the gap to the
north is essentially a screening move designed to bring Pokrovsk to the brink,
and our attention should be on the coming fall of the city, rather than on some
Russian exploiting maneuver to the north.
Situation around
Pokrovsk on 8/12/25, from Kalibrated
Maps
Things look no better
for Ukraine in other sectors of front. . . .
Putin will descend on
Alaska with full confidence, as events on the ground proceed in Russia’s favor.
Ukraine has already made it known that they
are categorically refusing to cede the Donbas, and it is easy to see how Kiev’s
pathologically devotion to its “territorial integrity” will upset the prospects
for a settlement. Both Ukraine and Russia insist that the four disputed oblasts
are nonnegotiable and sacrosanct territories, enshrined in their respective
constitutions. Fair enough, one supposes, but constitutions have no real power.
Armies do, and the Ukrainian army is looking increasingly threadbare, as it
cannibalizes its own force structure in a desperate search for warm bodies to
hold the line.
Lord Robert
Skidelsky. “Speech in the House of
Lords on Ukraine, 31st of October.” ACURA (Nov 05, 2025).
Until the end of last year, the agreed policy, as stated by then incoming
Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, was that “the British Government must leave the
Kremlin with no doubt that it will support Kyiv for as long as it takes to
achieve victory. Once Ukraine has prevailed, the United Kingdom should play a
leading […] Read in browser »
MK Bhadrakumar. “A
Third Way to end the war in Ukraine.”
ACURA (Apr 01, 2025).
The MI6’s unholy alliance with the notorious Azov militia
units comprising Ukrainian ultra-nationalists fired up by neo-Nazi ideology who
wield control of the power apparatus in Kiev even today, is a key factor in the
war, which complicates the prospects for President Trump’s efforts to end
the war. Suffice to say, Britain’s strategic defiance of Trump […]
END
UKRAINE WAR #37
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