OMNI
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NUCLEAR
ABOLITION NEWSLETTER # 18, February 8, 2014. OMNI Building a Culture of PEACE, Compiled
by Dick Bennett. (See #1, June 14, 2007; #2, January 8, 2008; #3 May 16, 2008; #4 June
10; 2009, #5 July 23, 2009, ; #6 Sept.
21, 2009; #7 August 29, 2010; #8 April 11, 2011; #9 August 4, 2011; #10 Feb.
27, 2012; #11 April 4, 2012; #12 June 27, 2012; #13 July 27, 2012; #14 August
11, 2012; #15, Dec. 4, 2012; #16 July 20, 2013; #17 Dec. 17, 2014) Imagine a world free of nuclear weapons, be committed to that goal, join
OMNI to strive with others for that goal.
US NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE
For seven years, these eighteen
newsletters, related newsletters, and the OMNI
Center for Peace, Justice, and Ecology
have been Arkansas
See OMNI’s Related NEWSLETTERS:
Nuclear Abolition Day June
2.
International Day against
Nuclear Tests August 29.
OMNI NUCLEAR FREE AND INDEPENDENT PACIFIC DAY AND MARSHALL ISLANDS
OMNI’s NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL DAYS PROJECT: Castle Bravo Explosion 60 Anniversary Feb. 28
Here is the link to all OMNI newsletters:
http://www.omnicenter.org/newsletter-archive/ The dozens of newsletters provide OMNI and the peace and
justice movement with subject-focused information and criticism. Here is the link to
the Index to the newsletters: http://www.omnicenter.org/omni-newsletter-general-index/
Nos. 12-17 at end of this
newsletter.
Contents #18
Remembering Nuclear
Testing at the Marshall
Islands
Resistance
to Nuclear Weapons
WAND
Protest March 25, 2014
25th
Anniversary, 2nd edition of Nuclear
Heartland to Be Published
Schlosser,
Dr. Strangelove and Nuclear War
Resistance,
Nevada Desert
Helen
Caldicott’s Books Still Speak to Us
News
from Anti-Nuclear UK
FCNL
Nuclear Calendar
Contact
your Arkansas
Steve Womack
202-225-4301
Tim Griffin
202-225-2506
Tom
Cotton
202-225-3772
Rick
Crawford 202-225-4076
Join the National Call-In Day –Tuesday, MARCH 25 -- to Reduce
Nuclear Weapons Spending
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WAND, Inc
691 Massachusetts Avenue Arlington MA 02476
322 4th Street NE | Washington, DC20002
250 Georgia Avenue S.E. Suite 202 Atlanta , GA
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250 Georgia Avenue S.E. Suite 202
Inevitability?
Winslow Myers
There was a major story in Time magazine
this week that military personnel were cheating on competency tests relating to
the command and control of American nuclear missiles. This was one more
confirmation of what we already know in our hearts but prefer not to examine
too closely: humans are too human, too
small, too fallible, to be in charge of the unfathomable destructive power of
nuclear weapons.
Activists, frustrated by a Congress in
the pocket of military-industrial corporations, have rightly shifted their
focus to building local coalitions that emphasize bottom-up renewal. The peace movement is still hard at
work, but overwhelmed by the size of the powers arrayed against it.
Maybe it's the top military brass of the
nuclear nations who ought to be leading the charge toward reciprocal
disarmament, because their political masters have laid upon them an impossible
task: to make zero mistakes when interpreting the behavior of other nations, to
keep these weapons and the people who handle them in a state of hair-trigger
readiness without tipping over the edge into accidents, and to avoid nuclear
winter should, God forbid, the weapons be used.
A tall order indeed, because our
experience with technologically complex
systems designed not to fail is that sometimes they all fail—not a
Rumsfeldian unknown unknown. Just as the occasional crash of a passenger plane
or a space shuttle has proven inevitable, or a Chernobyl or Fukushima or Three
Mile Island meltdown is unlikely but nevertheless has also proven inescapable,
so too it is inevitable that, unless we change direction as a species, there
will be a fatal incident involving nuclear weapons.
Some analysts claim that we are actually
in a more risky time than during the Cold War. As we see in the cheating
scandal, people in charge of the weapons, because their mission has been
rendered obsolete by the change from the cold war to the "war on terror,"
are tempted by laziness and corner-cutting.
The United States, even while a signatory
to international treaties that enjoin it to reduce its nuclear weapons and
cooperate with other states to reduce theirs, is poised to spend untold
billions, money needed desperately for, say, transitioning to clean,
sustainable sources of energy, to renew its nuclear weapons systems. The tail
of corporate profit wags the dog of nuclear policy, but neither the cost nor
the danger of nuclear weapons appears to be a high priority for most Americans.
Terrorism naturally gets more focus
today. Avoiding nuclear terrorism may actually be easier to accomplish than to
guarantee in perpetuity those impossible conditions attached to “legitimate”
state-controlled nuclear weapons. In the case of terrorists, the objective is
to secure and keep separate the parts and ingredients of weapons. The vast
majority of nations are in agreement with this goal and willing to cooperate to
reach it. Meanwhile the far greater danger may be the relentless momentum
engendered by the in-place weapons systems of the nuclear club, motivating more
states to want to join, resulting in more command and control complexity, and
more probability of misinterpretation.
In his famous poem “September 1, 1939,”
W.H. Auden wrote, “We must love one another or die.” Auden came to dislike the
poem for its preachiness. In 1955 he allowed it to be reprinted in an anthology
with the line altered to “We must love one another and die.” Though the
two lines obviously have different meanings, both versions are true. It
is inevitable that we will all die, whether we learn to love each other or not.
Is it also inevitable that we will die in nuclear fire or under gray skies of
nuclear ash? Not if nuclear nations
begin to have a conversation based in the common recognition that nuclear
weapons are not useful to planetary security.
[Call to the people to take action.]
Creative acts of love, truth-telling, and
inclusion are always open to us, as Nelson Mandela demonstrated. When the Nazis
occupied Denmark in April, 1940, 17-year-old Danish schoolboy Arne Sejr wrote
his "Ten Commandments" that were creative ways to nonviolently slow,
sabotage, and stymie Nazi goals in his country. In the dark days of 1943 the
people of Denmark, at great risk, not only spirited 7,800 Jews into neutral
Sweden to shield them from the invading Nazis, but also interceded on behalf of
the 5 percent who were already on their way to Theresienstadt, with the result
that 99 percent of Danish Jews were spared the Holocaust.
[Call to influential people to speak up.]
The nuclear Gordian knot is in equal need
of heroes who can cut into it with the sharp blade of truth, and spirit our
species into a new paradigm beyond our present false sense of security. Is it
possible such heroes might emerge from within the military-industrial complex
itself? We need more high-ranking Ellsbergs, Snowdens and Mannings, not only to
reveal secret data or expose competency breakdown, but to also assert that
security via nukes overall is a futile project—not only for the U.S. but for
all nations who possess or want nuclear weapons. Generals and weapons designers
have hearts and love their grandchildren like all of us. If a few of them spoke
out, the world would owe them a priceless debt of gratitude.
~~end~~
Winslow
Myers, author of “Living Beyond War: A Citizen’s Guide,” writes on global
issues for PeaceVoice and serves
on the Advisory Board of the War Prevention Initiative.
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REMEMBER THE MARSHALL ISLANDERS
You're invited to Nuclear Remembrance Day 2014: Reflect.
Honor. Educate. (Feb 28, 2014)
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25th ANNIVERSARY 2ND EDITION OF NUCLEAR HEARTLAND TO BE PUBLISHED
Nukewatch published this book in 1989 documenting some of the
history of nuclear warheads planted around the US. The book contained “directions to every
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in the nation. . . . Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
told the press that in publishing the book Nukewatch was aiding and abetting
the enemy. Since the former USSR already
knew exactly where all the missiles were, Weinberger seemed to imply that
public education was the enemy. . . .”
To support Nukewatch and the updated publication of this book,
go to www.nukewatchinfo.org
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NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION POSSIBLE
Eric Schlosser, “Almost Everything in
"Dr. Strangelove" Was True.”
The New Yorker , 25 January 14, Reader Supported News.
Schlosser
writes: "... we now know that American officers did indeed have the
ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction
of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or
unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn't been completely
eliminated."
READ MORE
JANUARY 23, 2014
ALMOST
EVERYTHING IN “DR. STRANGELOVE” WAS TRUE
POSTED BY ERIC SCHLOSSER
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PRINT
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This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s
black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film
caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally
deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union,
without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as
“dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to
Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the
comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being
implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events
in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of
Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear
weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further
from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When
“Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney
Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The
incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air
Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first
casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that
dictum. Half
a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear
strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids”
from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have
the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of
rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or
unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.
The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The
administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that
nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite
different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be
used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties
and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater
precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to
retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and
its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove
contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet
bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t
be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a
communications breakdown prevented NATOofficers from contacting the White
House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on
Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership?
Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?
With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American
officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or
no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire
their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading
toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American
commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without
contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and
“the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific
decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.”
Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could
make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of
command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an
attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot
worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really
controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation
of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on
this matter.”
President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few
weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A
subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was
told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his
own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security
advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American
officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American
nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them.
Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to
prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy,
Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United
States.
In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American
nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them
about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed
Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign
military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically
nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group,
was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that
were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew,
in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone
American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off
in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.
* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices
inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded
electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming
lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code
would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was
prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of
these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve
weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State
Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961:
“all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any
changes.”
After a crash program to develop the new control technology,
during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed
inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed byNATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied
only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and
the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in
their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of
not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And
locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very
existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would
create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire
Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military
discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A
two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a
nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human
Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional,
psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear
weapons.
Despite public assurances that everything was fully under
control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in
theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to
prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their
weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years,
consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter
George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of
accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove”
’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the
Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member
of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At
the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what
might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately
worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start
a nuclear war.
Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and
bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and
considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in
its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this
claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to
launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.
* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and
known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split
four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United
States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon,
each of them provided with half the code. Category APALs were useful mainly to delay
unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an
individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician
could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category
D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s
hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a
million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a
weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.
The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s
submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is
no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the
code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the
launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge.
Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch
a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the
combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the
sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if
Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s
crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.
The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear
weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human
endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel
Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or
psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s
top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither
appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the
button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”
Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at
the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s
nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit
gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to
the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount”
of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days
later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of
America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct
“unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.”According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air
Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia,
behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young
foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public
hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a
Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square.
Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play
the guitar.
While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott
Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious
public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S.
national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst
morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the
spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North
Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In
August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana
failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that
thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on
proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being
investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND
Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found
that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel
with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with
other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch
officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”
The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is
the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger
itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear
weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the
world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the
Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose
and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The
whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the
President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if
you keep it a secret!”
A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union
began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that
could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight
from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film.
Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated,
Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States
if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t
be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept
secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years
after the Cold War ended.
In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more
accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control
systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the
Pentagon, and the mainstream media.
“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley
says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory
system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question
remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak,
and terrifyingly on the mark.
You can read Eric Schlosser’s guide to the long-secret documents that help explain the risks America
took with its nuclear arsenal, and watch and read his deconstruction of clips from “Dr. Strangelove” and from a little-seen film about permissive action links.
Eric Schlosser is the author of “Command and Control.”
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CATHOLIC
USA RESISTANCE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Log In
….'acting to halt nuclear weapons production
at the Atomic Weapons Establishment factories at Aldermaston and
Burghfield'….
·
Links�
THE MESSAGE....
     
APPEAL FOR HELP – PROJECT GETTING BIG AND BUSY!
 
ORDER ACTION AWE T-SHIRTS ON-LINE
ACTION AWE FUNDRAISING…
 
WORLD IN CHAINS: THE TRIDENT LINKS
VIDEOS WE LIKE…
INSPIRATIONAL PROTEST IDEAS…
GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING THIS YEAR
£105,127,558,245
GENERAL NEWS & COMMENT ON GLOBAL ISSUES
META
·
Log in
Welcome to Action AWE!
January 3, 2013
By admin
Action AWE (Atomic
Weapons Eradication) is a grassroots campaign of nonviolent actions
dedicated to halting nuclear weapons production at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment factories at Aldermaston and Burghfield. The purpose is
for groups and individuals to undertake autonomous actions and events from
February 2013 onwards to raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons…
Press Release:
ACTION AWE “CRIMESTOPPERS” REPORT ATOMIC WEAPONS ESTABLISHMENT FOR PREPARING
TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
February 8, 2014
By admin
PRESS RELEASE 8
February 2014 ActionAWE/Angie Zelter 0745-658-8943 or Andrew Dey 0772 299
9015 or press@actionawe.org ACTION AWE “CRIMESTOPPERS” REPORT ATOMIC WEAPONS
ESTABLISHMENT FOR PREPARING TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Reading, Berkshire, 8 February 2014:- A line of 50 people
queu… GO TO
http://actionawe.org/ This group has much to teach us in original
protest, courage, and persistence.
–Dick
WORLD IN CHAINS: THE TRIDENT LINKS, Essays & Papers
Nuclear disarmament is linked to many vital issues, and we have commissioned short
‘linking essays’ from other individuals, organisations, and campaigns to make
these links more explicit and to deepen our understanding of the bigger
picture within which we are working.
Essays and articles which make the
connections between nuclear weapons and the big issues impacting on the world
today.
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REMEMBER HELEN CALDICOTT, STILL SPEAKING TO US TODAY
FCNL’S NUCLEAR (WEAPONS) CALENDAR
[with Dick’s comments] WORK ON THIS
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Dec. 19-23
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Former basketball star Dennis Rodman returns
to North Korea.
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Jan. 2
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U.S. Strategic Command reports to Congress on the underground
tunnel network in China with respect to the capability of the United States
to use conventional and nuclear forces to neutralize such tunnels and what is
stored within such tunnels (Public Law 112-239,
Sec. 1045). [What
other country is formally discussing
in the world
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Jan. 4
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6:00 p.m., Joseph Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund, book discussion ofNuclear Nightmares: Securing
the World Before It Is Too Late
 . Politics and Prose, 5015 Connecticut Ave.,
NW, Washington. |
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Jan. 6
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Senate convenes.
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Jan. 7
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House of Representatives convenes.
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Jan. 7
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Time TBA, Jeffrey Lewis, Marc Quint and Jon Wolfsthal,
Monterey Institute, "The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic
Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years." Monterey Institute,
1400 K St., NW, Washington.
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Jan. 8
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12:30-2:30 p.m., Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), report
launch of the2014 NTI Nuclear Materials
Security Index. At the Four Season Hotel, Dumbarton Room,
2800 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington. By invitation only.
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Jan. 8
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Jim Miller, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, leaves
office.
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Jan. 8
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6:00 p.m., Joseph Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund; and Eric
Schlosser, journalist and author, "Reducing the Nuclear Nightmare."
Commonwealth Club of California, 595 Market St., San Francisco, CA.
Register online.
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Jan. 10
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House floor action on a Omnibus Appropriation/Continuing
Resolution for fiscal year 2014 (estimate). Broadcast and webcast onC-SPAN.
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Jan. 13
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Senate floor action on a Omnibus Appropriation/Continuing
Resolution for fiscal year 2014 (estimate). Broadcast and webcast onC-SPAN2.
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[NuclearCalendar] Nuclear Calendar
nuclearcalendar-bounces@fcnl.org on behalf of Nuclear Calendar
[nuclearcalendar@fcnl.org]
Actions
To:
NuclearCalendar@lists101.his.com
Monday, January 13,
2014 8:09 AM
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Contents of #14 August 14, 2012
Video
Underground: Hydrogen Bomb Testing in
Marshall Islands
Chomsky,
US/SU Nuclear Confrontation at Cuba
From
the Nuclear Abolitionist
Annual
Desert Protest
Resisters
Receive New Felony Charges
Contents of #15
Protesters
Arrested, Sign Petition
Plutonium
Cores Project Stopped
India’s
Tests
Mayors
vs. Nukes
Uranium
Mines
The Nuclear Resister (Sept. 3, 2012)
Nevada
Desert Experience (NDE)
Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation (NAPF)
Contents #16
Disarmament
Video Contest
The Nuclear Resister (March 17, 2013)
WAND,
End the MOX Program
Sign
Declaration Against Nuclear Deterrence
Eiger,
Actions Arguments Against Nuclear Weapons
Chomsky,
Nuclear War Threats
Chomsky’s
New Book, Nuclear War and Environmental
Catastrophe
Green,
Consequences of Nuclear Attack
Contents #17
Damascus,
Arkansas Nuclear Explosion
Nuclear
War: What It Might Be Like
Schillinger,
Novel Envisions Manhattan After Nuclear Blast
Opposition
to Nuclear Weapons, Abolition Movement
Pope
Francis for Abolition
Joseph
Rotblat, Opponent of Nuclear Weapons
History
Past
Nuclear Close Calls
Thirteen Days, Year 2000 Film About
Cuban Missile Crisis
Contact
President Obama
END NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NEWSLETTER #18
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