OMNI “PEARL
HARBOR DAY,” COLONIAL PACIFIC WORLD WAR II NEWSLETTER #6, December 7, 2013.
Compiled by Dick Bennett. Another
in OMNI’s NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL DAYS
series for a Culture of Nonviolent, Positive Peace (for more information see
below).
My blog: War
Department/Peace Department
My Newsletters:
Index:
OMNI is part of the
international peace, justice, and ecology movement. These newsletters contribute to the
movement’s efforts to understand the causes of wars in order to prevent
them. A close study of the origins of
WWII in the Pacific, uncontaminated by the myths and propaganda generated by
patriotism, strengthens enormously our critical thinking toward US wars. See the Newsletters “US Imperialism,
Continental Westward Expansion” and “US Westward Imperialism, Pacific/E. Asia”
and a dozen related newsletters.
Contents of #1 2008
Dick: US
History of Wars of Aggression Includes WWII in the Pacific
Contents of #2 2010
Dick: Review of
David Swanson’s War Is a Lie
Contents #3
2011
Dick: US Empire and WWII in
Pacific
Wikianswers
Wiest and Mattson
Chomsky: Backgrounds
Revolutionary Work
Contents #4
2012
Dick: No Choice But War
Maslin Reviews Bradley
TomDispatch/Klare: It Wasn’t Al-Qaeda, It’s China
Cyber Pearl
Harbor ?
Climate Pearl
Harbor ?
Contents #5
March 23, 2013
Conroy, et al., West Across
the Pacific, Revisionist Account
Contents #6 December 7, 2013
Ienaga, Pacific War, 1931-1945 (2010, 2 Reviews)
George Victor, Pearl Harbor Myth (2007)
Robert Higgs, US Economic
Warfare Provoked Attack (essay 2012)
Greaves, Seeds. . .of Infamy
Tansill, Back Door to War
Morgenstern, Secret War
Connect with us.
Pacific War, 1931-1945
Written by Saburo Ienaga. Pantheon, 2010.
|
A portrayal of how and why Japan waged war
from 1931-1945 and what life was like for the Japanese people in a society
engaged in total war.
Rev. by Daniel Ford
The Pacific War
"[General Akamatsu] ordered local inhabitants to turn
over all food supplies to the army and commit suicide before U.S. troops
landed. The obedient islanders, 329 all together, killed each other at the Onna River
with razors, hatchets, and sickles."
It's bad enough when you read this stuff written by an
American, but when it comes from a Japanese writer it's really unsettling.
Saburo Ienaga was a high-school teacher during the war and a university
professor afterward; he got into trouble with the authorities for trying to
bring some balance to the high-school history texts in the 1950 and 1960s, when
the Cold War and the end of the U.S.
occupation allowed the schools to gloss Japan 's role in World War II. I
read this book when I was researching the Flying Tigers, but to sit down and
read it on its own merits was a revelation. (Sorry about the cover! Obviously
the publisher's design staff didn't take the time to read the book.)
Americans may be startled to pick up a 256-page book about
the Pacific War and discover that Pearl Harbor
isn't mentioned until page 135, more than halfway through. That's a consequence
of Ienaga's belief that the war began with the Japanese army's 1931 coup in
Manchuria, which led inevitably to war with China , which in turn led to the
wider war that began in December 1941. Despite Japan 's
claims about liberating Asians from white colonialism, its purpose in going to war with the Americans, British, and Dutch was
to obtain the raw materials with which to prosecute the war in China . That
was one reason the Japanese treated the "liberated" people so
badly--as badly as they treated their prisoners of war, which was as bad as
anything east of the German death camps. . . .
This is a valuable book, and one of only a half-dozen serious
studies by Japanese scholars of World War II that are available in English. We
didn't know our enemy in 1941; we hardly know him any better.
Pacific War Book Review
Home | Final Patrols | Links | Pips & Blips | Site Index
. . . The Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga spent most of
his life challenging his government's censorship of academic textbooks. His
motivation was to educate the Japanese people about his country's wartime
atrocities. As a young high school teacher, he was part of the system used to
indoctrinate young minds with wartime propaganda and foster students'
motivation to fight for and follow blindly a divine emperor. Back then, the
militaristic government's controls over education made him fearful of
expressing dissent.
After the war, the education ministry disapproved a high
school textbook he had written because it included vivid accounts of Japanese
wartime atrocities: the 1937 Nanking massacre, the army's germ warfare unit
(Unit 731) and its inhumane experiments on Chinese prisoners, the forced
suicides of Okinawan citizens by the military, and the use of Korean women as
sex-slaves for Japanese troops. The government felt his book was too critical
of Japanese actions in World War II, and that it did not accurately portray the
wartime government's actions and principles.
This episode was the start of a 32-year battle in and out
of the courts between Ienaga and the government over whose version of the World
War II atrocities was correct and whether the government's censorship policy
was appropriate. More than anything else, Ienaga was seeking a moral victory.
He won very little else out of all the court cases. He was, however, nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999
and 2001. Today the Japanese government favors a view of its history that
is less critical of its past, a development which Ienaga, who died in 2002,
would be very unhappy with.
His book is a fascinating look at World War II from the
Japanese perspective and a vivid narrative of life in a state-controlled
society. For them, World War II began
with the Japanese army's 1931 takeover in Manchuria .
(In fact, the attack on Pearl Harbor is not
mentioned in Ienaga's book until page 135.) Ienaga maintains that Japan 's
primary concern was the Chinese
communists. They could foment trouble within the Korean and Chinese working
classes, which could negatively affect the flow of food, raw and manufactured
materials, and cheap labor to the homeland from these Far
East acquisitions. This in turn could ignite unrest at home and
impede Japan 's
gears of war. If this happened, the militarists could lose control of the
government. The militarists did not fear America and the other western
powers as much. It was always felt they would sue for peace after Japan secured
its initial conquests in the Pacific. . .
Updated Friday, 22-Mar-2013 11:31:28 EDT
Updated Friday, 22-Mar-2013 11:31:28 EDT
The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Potomac 's Military Controversies) Paperback
Did U.S.
intelligence know of Japan 's
coming attack on Pearl Harbor ? Did President
Roosevelt know? If so, why did he withhold warnings from the commanders in Hawaii ? The answers are
embedded in the cogent analysis of The
Pearl Harbor Myth. Based on voluminous
data that does not appear in other books on the topic, it discusses in detail Roosevelt 's developing strategy-both military and
diplomatic-and his secret alliances to save the world from Hitler. It contains
a wealth of fresh material on secret diplomacy; on secret military strategy,
planning, and intelligence; and on disguised combat operations that began six
months before the Pearl Harbor attack.
How U.S.
Economic Warfare Provoked Japan 's
Attack on Pearl Harbor
A
A
[This talk was the Arthur M. Krolman Lecture at the 30th
Anniversary Supporters Summit of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Callaway Gardens , Georgia , on October 26, 2012. Click here to watch the video of this talk.]
Many people are misled by
formalities. They assume, for example, that the United
States went to war against Germany
and Japan
only after its declarations of war against these nations in December 1941. In
truth, the United States
had been at war for a long time before making these declarations. Its war making took a variety
of forms. For example, the U.S. navy conducted "shoot [Germans] on
sight" convoys - convoys that might include British ships — in the North
Atlantic along the greater part of the shipping route from the United States to
Great Britain, even though German U-boats had orders to refrain (and did
refrain) from initiating attacks on U.S. shipping. The United States and Great Britain entered into
arrangements to pool intelligence, combine weapons development, test military
equipment jointly, and undertake other forms of war-related cooperation. The U.S. military
actively cooperated with the British military in combat operations against the
Germans, for example, by alerting the British navy of aerial or marine
sightings of German submarines, which the British then attacked. The U.S. government
undertook in countless ways to provide military and other supplies and
assistance to the British, the French, and the Soviets, who were fighting the
Germans. The U.S.
government also provided military and other supplies and assistance, including
warplanes and pilots, to the Chinese, who were at war with Japan .[1] The U.S.
military actively engaged in planning with the British, the British
Commonwealth countries, and the Dutch East Indies for future combined combat
operations against Japan .
Most important, the U.S. government engaged in a series of increasingly
stringent economic warfare measures that pushed the Japanese into a predicament
that U.S. authorities well understood would probably provoke them to attack
U.S. territories and forces in the Pacific region in a quest to secure
essential raw materials that the Americans, British, and Dutch (government in
exile) had embargoed. [2]
Consider these summary
statements by George Victor, by no means a Roosevelt basher, in his well documented book The Pearl Harbor Myth.
Roosevelt had already led the United
States into war with Germany in the spring of 1941—into
a shooting war on a small scale. From then on, he gradually increased U.S. military
participation. Japan 's
attack on December 7 enabled him to increase it further and to obtain a war
declaration. Pearl Harbor is more
fully accounted for as the end of a long chain of events, with the U.S. contribution reflecting a strategy
formulated after France
fell. . . . In the eyes of Roosevelt and his advisers, the measures taken early
in 1941 justified a German declaration of war on the United States —a declaration that
did not come, to their disappointment. . . . Roosevelt told his ambassador to
France, William Bullitt, that U.S. entry into war against Germany was certain
but must wait for an "incident," which he was "confident that
the Germans would give us." . . . Establishing a record in which the enemy
fired the first shot was a theme that ran through Roosevelt 's
tactics. . . . He seems [eventually] to have concluded—correctly as it turned
out—that Japan would be
easier to provoke into a major attack on the Unites States than Germany would
be. [3]
The claim that Japan
attacked the United States
without provocation was . . . typical rhetoric. It worked because the public
did not know that the administration had expected Japan to respond with war to
anti-Japanese measures it had taken in July 1941. . . . Expecting to lose a war
with the United States —and
lose it disastrously—Japan 's
leaders had tried with growing desperation to negotiate. On this point, most
historians have long agreed. Meanwhile, evidence has come out that Roosevelt
and Hull
persistently refused to negotiate. . . . Japan
. . . offered compromises and concessions, which the United States countered with
increasing demands. . . . It was after learning of Japan 's
decision to go to war with the United States
if the talks "break down" that Roosevelt
decided to break them off. . . . According to Attorney General Francis Biddle,
Roosevelt said he hoped for an "incident" in the Pacific to bring the
United States
into the European war.[4]
These facts and numerous others that point in the same direction
are for the most part anything but new; many of them have been available to the
public since the 1940s. As early as 1953, anyone might have read a collection
of heavily documented essays on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the
late 1930s and early 1940s, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, that showed the
numerous ways in which the U.S. government bore responsibility for the
country's eventual engagement in World War II—showed, in short, that the
Roosevelt administration wanted to get the country into the war and worked
craftily along various avenues to ensure that, sooner or later, it would get
in, preferably in a way that would unite public opinion behind the war by
making the United States appear to have been the victim of an aggressor's
unprovoked attack.[5] As Secretary of War Henry Stimson
testified after the war, "we needed the Japanese to commit the first overt
act." [6]
At present,
however, seventy years after these events, probably not one American in
1,000—nay, not one in 10,000—has an inkling of any of this history. So
effective has been the pro-Roosevelt, pro-American, pro-World War II faction
that in this country it has utterly dominated teaching and popular writing
about U.S.
engagement in the "Good War."
In the late
nineteenth century, Japan 's
economy began to grow and to industrialize rapidly. Because Japan has few
natural resources, many of its burgeoning industries had to rely on imported
raw materials, such as coal, iron ore or steel scrap, tin, copper, bauxite,
rubber, and petroleum. Without access to such imports, many of which came from
the United States or from
European colonies in Southeast Asia ,
Japan 's
industrial economy would have ground to a halt. By engaging in international
trade, however, the Japanese had built a moderately advanced industrial economy
by 1941.
At the same
time, they also built a military-industrial complex to support an increasingly
powerful army and navy. These armed forces allowed Japan to project its power
into various places in the Pacific and East Asia, including Korea and northern
China, much as the United States used its growing industrial might to equip
armed forces that projected U.S. power into the Caribbean, Latin America, and
even as far away as the Philippine Islands.
When Franklin D.
Roosevelt became president in 1933, the U.S.
government fell under the control of a man who disliked the Japanese and
harbored a romantic affection for the Chinese because, some writers have
speculated, Roosevelt's ancestors had made money in the China trade.[7] Roosevelt
also disliked the Germans in general and Adolf Hitler in particular, and he
tended to favor the British in his personal relations and in world affairs. He
did not pay much attention to foreign policy, however, until his New Deal began
to peter out in 1937. Thereafter he relied heavily on foreign policy to fulfill
his political ambitions, including his desire for reelection to an
unprecedented third term.
When Germany
began to rearm and to seek Lebensraum aggressively
in the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration
cooperated closely with the British and the French in measures to oppose German
expansion. After World War II commenced in 1939, this U.S. assistance
grew ever greater and included such measures as the so-called destroyer deal
and the deceptively named Lend-Lease program. In anticipation of U.S. entry into the war, British and U.S. military
staffs secretly formulated plans for joint operations. U.S. forces sought to
create a war-justifying incident by cooperating with the British navy in
attacks on German U-boats in the northern Atlantic, but Hitler refused to take
the bait, thus denying Roosevelt the pretext he craved for making the United
States a full-fledged, declared belligerent—a belligerence that the great
majority of Americans opposed.
In June 1940,
Henry L. Stimson, who had been
secretary of war under William Howard Taft and secretary of state under Herbert
Hoover, became secretary of war again. Stimson was a lion of the Anglophile,
northeastern upper crust and no friend of the Japanese. In support of the so-called Open Door Policy for China , Stimson favored the use of economic
sanctions to obstruct Japan 's
advance in Asia . Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes vigorously endorsed this policy.
Roosevelt hoped that such sanctions would goad the Japanese into making a rash
mistake by launching a war against the United States, which would bring in Germany because Japan
and Germany
were allied.
The Roosevelt
administration, while curtly dismissing Japanese diplomatic overtures to
harmonize relations, accordingly imposed a series of increasingly stringent
economic sanctions on Japan .
In 1939, the United States
terminated the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan . "On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the
President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense
materials." Under this authority, "[o]n July 31, exports of aviation
motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were
restricted." Next, in a move aimed at Japan ,
Roosevelt slapped an embargo, effective October 16, "on all exports of
scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain
and the nations of the Western Hemisphere ."
Finally, on July 26, 1941, Roosevelt "froze Japanese assets in the United States ,
thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end. One
week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were
in commercial flow to Japan ." [8] The British and the Dutch followed
suit, embargoing exports to Japan
from their colonies in Southeast Asia .
Roosevelt and
his subordinates knew they were putting Japan in an untenable position and
that the Japanese government might well try to escape the stranglehold by going
to war. Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the American leaders knew,
among many other things, what Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda had communicated
to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura on July 31: "Commercial and economic
relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United
States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it
much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take
measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas ."[9]
Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese
naval code, the leaders in Washington also
knew that Japan 's
"measures" would include an attack on Pearl
Harbor .[10] Yet they withheld this critical
information from the commanders in Hawaii ,
who might have headed off the attack or prepared themselves to defend against
it. That Roosevelt and his chieftains did not ring the tocsin makes perfect
sense: after all, the impending attack constituted precisely what they had been
seeking for a long time. As Stimson confided to his diary after a meeting of
the War Cabinet on November 25, "The question was how we should maneuver
them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger
to ourselves." After the attack, Stimson confessed that "my first
feeling was of relief . . . that a crisis had come in a way which would unite
all our people."[11]
Robert Higgs is senior fellow in political economy for the
Independent Institute and editor of The Independent Review. He is the
2007 recipient of the Gary G. Schlarbaum Prize for Lifetime Achievement in the
Cause of Liberty. Send him mail.
See Robert Higgs's article archives.
You can subscribe to future articles by Robert Higgs via this RSS feed.
Copyright ©
2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.
Notes
[2] Robert Higgs, "How U.S. Economic Warfare Provoked Japan 's Attack on Pearl
Harbor ," The Freeman 56 (May 2006): 36-37.
[3] George Victor, The Pearl Harbor
Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Dulles , Va. :
Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 179-80, 184, 185, emphasis added.
[5] See Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath, edited
by Harry Elmer Barnes (Caldwell,
Id.: Caxton Printers, 1953).
[7] Harry Elmer Barnes, "Summary and
Conclusions," in Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), 682-83.
[8] All quotations in this paragraph are from George
Morgenstern, "The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor ,"
in Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace, 322-23,
327-28.
[10] Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and
Pearl Harbor (New York : Free Press,
2000).
PEARL HARBOR : THE SEEDS AND FRUITS OF INFAMY
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Back Door to
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Charles Callan Tansill
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This
professionally prepared ebook is an electronic edition of the book . . .
Charles Callan Tansill, one of the
foremost American diplomatic historians of the twentieth century, argues that FDR wished to involve the United States
in the European War that began in September 1939. When he proved unable to do
so directly, he determined to provoke Japan into an
attack on American territory. Doing so would involve Japan ’s Axis
allies in war also, and we would thus enter the war through the “back door”.
The strategy succeeded, and Tansill maintains that Roosevelt in accord with it
welcomed Japan ’s attack on Pearl Harbor . The book is based on exhaustive research in
the State Department archives.
Publication InformationWestport , CT : Greenwood Press
Publishers, 1952.
Updated 11/6/2012
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newsletters:
http://www.omnicenter.org/newsletter-archive/
This newsletter continues
OMNI’s NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL DAYS PROJECT. Half of the Project affirms nonviolent DAYs,
such as Human Rights Day. The other half
offers nonviolent, world cooperative alternatives to violent, imperial, or
generally misdirected days, as with the following:
Feb.
14: Standing on the Side of Love Day
(formerly Valentine’s Day)
May, 2nd Sunday:
Julia Ward Howe’s Mother’s Day for Peace (Mother’s Day)
3rd Sat. in May:
Peace Forces Day (Armed Forces Day)
May, last Monday: Day of Mourning for Victims of Wars (Memorial
Day)
June 14: Liberty
and Justice for All Day (Flag Day)
June, 3rd
Sunday: Father’s Day for Peace (Father’s Day)
September 11 (9-11): Peaceful Tomorrows Day (Patriot Day)
Oct., 2nd Monday: Indigenous Peoples Day
(Columbus Day):
Nov. 11: World Unity Day (Veterans Day) (Or Armistice Day in 1918
when WWI ended).
November: Fourth
Thursday: National Day of Gratitude and
Atonement (Thanksgiving)
December 7: Pacific Colonial War Day (Pearl
Harbor Day)
December 25: Love and Peacemaking Day (Christmas)
END PACIFIC COLONIAL WAR/PEARL
HARBOR DAY NEWSLETTER #6 December
7, 2013
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